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A R T I C L E S

Plain Meaning,
Precedent, and
Metaphysics:
Interpreting
the “Navigble
Waters” Element
of the Clean
Water Act
Offense
by Jeffrey G. Miller
Jeffrey G. Miller is Professor of Law
Emeritus at Pace Law School.

This Article, the third in a series of five, examines
the meaning of “navigable waters” under the Clean
Water Act. It traces the traditional judicial interpretation of navigable waters and how Congress and EPA
attempted to extend its meaning, then examines how
the term has been applied in the context of tributaries and wetlands, isolated waters, groundwater, and
EPA’s unitary theory of navigable waters. The author
then analyzes EPA and the Corps’ 2014 proposed
amendments to the definition of “waters of the United
States,” and concludes that those amendments may
resolve much of the interpretive crisis.

Introduction

The Clean Water Act (CWA)1 in §301(a) prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant by any person,”2 unless in compliance
with several listed sections authorizing the issuance of two
types of permits3 and specifying their substantive requirements. In §502(12), the statute defines “discharge of a pollutant” to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source.”4 In sum, the subsection prohibits (1) any addition (2) of any pollutant (3) to navigable
waters (4) from any point source (5) by any person, except in
compliance with a CWA permit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has called this the CWA’s “core command.”5
This Article reviews the meaning of “navigable
waters”—a traditional Commerce Clause jurisdictional
phrase denoting waters associated with transportation, but
with a short CWA statutory definition having nothing to
do with waterborne transportation.6 The Article examines
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 2014
proposed amendments to its definition of “waters of the
United States” and concludes that those proposed amendments may resolve much of the interpretive crisis. The Article also examines EPA’s theory that all navigable waters are
one (the unitary navigable waters theory), and argues that
the theory is inconsistent with the CWA and should be
disavowed by EPA and rejected by the courts.
In §502(6), the CWA defines navigable waters to mean
“the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas.” Of all the elements in the CWA’s core command, only
“navigable waters” had a developed legal meaning before
Author’s Note: The author acknowledges and thanks Laura Young,
Pace 2014, for her assistance in completing the research and analysis
for and editing of this Article, and Christine Swatzell, Pace 2012,
for her assistance in the initial research and analysis for the Article.
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4.	

5.	

6.	

Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. FWPCA
§§101-607.
33 U.S.C. §1311(a).
Permits issued pursuant to CWA §402, 33 U.S.C. §1342, regulate water
pollution; permits issued pursuant to CWA §404, 33 U.S.C. §404, 33
U.S.C. §1344, regulate filling streams or wetlands.
33 U.S.C. §1362(12). Because the term defined in CWA §502(12), “discharge of a pollutant,” is not exactly the same as the term used in CWA
§301(a), “the discharge of any pollutant,” the definition in §502(12) arguably does not apply to the phrase used in §301(a). However, courts routinely refer to §502(12) as defining discharge of any pollutant in §301(a),
without noting the difference. (Emphases added throughout.) See Jeffrey G.
Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Addition”
Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 44 ELR 10770 n.4 (Sept. 2014)
[hereinafter Miller, Addition]. In any event, discharge itself is defined to include the discharge of a pollutant, §502(16), the term defined in §502(12).
Coeur Alaska Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261,
298 (2009). The author has called it elsewhere the basic prohibition of the
CWA. See Jeffrey G. Miller et al., Introduction to Environmental
Law: Cases and Materials on Water Pollution Control 141 (2008).
33 U.S.C. §1362(7). The touchstone of “navigable waters” for Commerce
Clause jurisdictional purposes is use in waterborne navigation. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

6-2015

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

enactment of the statute. First, the U.S. Supreme Court
developed that legal meaning in one dozen decisions over
the preceding century and a half, establishing the extent of
the U.S. Congress’ constitutional authority to develop and
regulate waterways under the Commerce Clause. Second,
the statutory definition of navigable waters, “the waters
of the United States,” attempts to broaden the element’s
meaning, while the statutory definitions of the other elements narrow their meanings. (For example, the statutory
definition of “pollutant” limits it to specifically listed materials and categories of materials.7) Third, Congress devoted
substantial legislative history to the intended broad reach
of navigable waters, while providing far less legislative history to the meanings of the other elements.8
The courts’ historical familiarity with interpreting navigable waters suggests they should be more comfortable
interpreting the term under the CWA than interpreting
other elements of the CWA offense. Indeed, this is the
case; the Supreme Court and lower courts have interpreted
navigable waters far more often than they have interpreted
any of the other elements.9 The historical role of the courts
in shaping the meaning of the term navigable waters also
suggests that they should be more willing to disregard or
overrule an Agency interpretation of the term than to disregard or overrule Agency interpretations of other elements
of the CWA offense. Indeed, this too is the case; the Court
has twice overruled EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) interpretations of navigable waters, but
has not overruled their interpretations of other elements
in the CWA offense.10 Finally, the availability of one century and a half of judicial decisions interpreting navigable
waters prior to the CWA makes it unsurprising that courts
7.	

CWA §502(6), 33 U.S.C. §1352(6). The listed categories of materials, however, cover a vast territory. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent,
and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Pollutant” Element of the Federal Water
Pollution Offense, 44 ELR 10960, 10963-64 (Nov. 2014) [hereinafter Miller, Pollutant].
8.	 Compare the discussion of the legislative history of “navigable waters” in
this Article with the discussions of legislative history in Miller, Addition,
supra note 4, at 10773; and Miller, Pollutant, supra note 7, at 10962-63.
9.	 The Court has interpreted navigable waters in six decisions: Los Angeles
County Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 133 S. Ct. 710, 43
ELR 20004 (2013); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 36 ELR 20116
(2006); South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541
U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001);
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 17 ELR 20327 (1987);
and United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 16 ELR
20086 (1985). It has interpreted “addition” in two decisions and “pollutant”
in three decisions. See Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10804-05; Miller,
Pollutant, supra note 7, at 10981-83. The author’s research (set out in tbl. A
to this Article) has found that lower courts interpreted navigable waters in
137 decisions; addition in 63 decisions, see Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at
10804-05; and pollutant in 68 decisions, see Miller, Pollutant, supra note 7,
at 10981-83. The greater number of navigable waters decisions also results
from parties challenging interpretations of that element more than the other
elements, but that probably results from the same factors.
10. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715; SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159.
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use precedent more often than other interpretive devices
such as plain meaning to determine the meaning of the
term in the CWA. And indeed they have done so: Precedent is by far the most commonly used device for judicial
interpretation of navigable waters,11 while plain meaning is
the most commonly used device for judicial interpretation
of some of the other elements.
The major tension in interpreting the CWA’s navigable
waters element is the inherent conflict between judicial
interpretation of Congress’ authority to develop and regulate
navigable waters for promoting interstate and foreign commerce, and Congress’ subsequent use of the term to establish
expansive EPA authority for improving and maintaining
water quality. The importance of a waterway for transportation may have little connection to water quality. Congress
appeared to have understood this disconnect and to distance
CWA jurisdiction from waterborne commerce by defining
navigable waters as “the waters of the United States,” a more
expansive term having nothing to do with transportation.
But because Congress used “navigable waters” as an element
of the CWA offense, it invited judicial focus on the term
rather than on its definition, because courts were familiar
with that term, having interpreted it for over one century
and a half. Courts understood the historical meaning of
navigable waters far more than they understood the meanings of “waters of the United States” or of the CWA’s other
elements. And because of the Supreme Court’s current fascination with textualism, it has great difficulty divorcing
navigable waters entirely from waterborne transportation;
“navigable” must mean something.
If the CWA dealt only with pollution control under
the §402 permit program,12 the disconnect between promotion of interstate commerce and protection of water
quality might not have ripened into a jurisdictional crisis.
The primary issue would have been whether particular
tributaries of navigable waters were within the jurisdiction of the CWA, when those tributaries themselves had
never and could never support waterborne transportation.
Because tributaries, even remote ones,13 contribute both
water and pollution to the navigable waters into which
they flow, they directly affect those navigable waters. The
water volumes they contribute increase the navigability of
the receiving waters, and the water pollution they contrib11. In the 137 lower court decisions the author found interpreting navigable
waters, precedent was used in 124 decisions. Courts used the second most
popular interpretive device, broad interpretation to achieve statutory goals,
in only 51 decisions. The statistical analysis is set out in tbl. B to this Article.
By contrast, in the 68 decisions interpreting pollutant, courts used plain
meaning in 55 decisions, but precedent in only 27 decisions. See Miller,
Pollutant, supra note 7, at 10806-07.
12. 33 U.S.C. §1342.
13. Headwater streams, for instance, contribute 60% of the total flow to northeastern streams and rivers. See 79 Fed. Reg. 22188, 22224 (proposed Apr.
21, 2014) (scientific support for EPA’s proposed amendments).
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ute may interfere with the navigability of the receiving
waters. The Court had recognized congressional power to
develop flood control projects in watersheds of navigable
waters to protect against floods on the navigable waters
into which the tributaries directly and indirectly flowed.14
The same rationale applies to controlling discharges of
pollutants into tributaries of navigable waters to protect
the water quality of the navigable waters into which the
tributaries flow.
But the CWA did not deal only with pollution control
under the §402 permit program; it also dealt with filling
wetlands under the §404 permit program.15 While wetlands contribute both water and pollutants to the navigable waters into which they flow and protect those navigable
waters from flooding and pollution,16 their contributions
to adjacent or downstream navigation and water quality
may not be apparent to the uninitiated. Moreover, wetlands may not exhibit surface water for months at a time,
when to the untrained eye they may be indistinguishable
from the surrounding dry land. Wetlands pose two problems for the Court’s historical view or even for the plain
meaning of navigable waters: Wetlands do not directly
support waterborne navigation and, at least when they are
dry, are not waters at all.
Unfortunately, narrowing interpretations of navigable waters to defeat §404 jurisdiction over wetlands may
also defeat §402 jurisdiction over tributaries of navigable
waters, because terms are to be interpreted in the same
manner throughout a statute,17 unless the statute explicitly
indicates otherwise. The CWA reiterates this interpretive
canon by beginning its definitional §502 “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, when used in this chapter . . .
‘navigable waters’ . . . ‘means’ . . . .” And it does not provide
in §402, §404, or elsewhere that the term has different
meanings in §§402 and 404.
Aside from the Corps’ initial, interim regulatory definition of navigable waters, which merely repeated the
Court’s traditional interpretation of the term, EPA and the
Corps’ regulatory definitions have followed legislative history to interpret the term broadly. After recent setbacks
from the Supreme Court,18 however, the two agencies have
recently proposed an amended definition of “waters of the
United States” that preserves much of their earlier regulations’ breadth, but retrenches it where the Court’s recent
decisions give the agencies no room to do otherwise. The
preamble to the proposed rulemaking offers a detailed jus-

14. See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
15. 33 U.S.C. §1344.
16. The Court briefly surveyed the benefits of wetlands in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134-35, 16 ELR 20086 (1985).
For a more extensive treatment of the subject, see William L. Want, Law
of Wetlands Regulation §2.01[1] (1993).
17. William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 324
(1994); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 170-73
(2012).
18. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006); Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
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tification for the controversial portions of the definitions,
much of it scientific.19
These dynamics frame the interpretive battles examined in this Article. We begin by tracing the development
of the traditional judicial interpretation of navigable
waters and how Congress and EPA attempted to extend
its meaning. The Article then examines the primary battlefields for interpreting navigable waters: tributaries and
wetlands, isolated waters, groundwater, and EPA’s unitary
theory of navigable waters.20 Along the way, the Article
takes sidelong glances at a wild card in these interpretive battles, the development of the CWA’s §404 program
regulating the filling of wetlands. The §404 program has
provided proponents of narrowly interpreting “navigable
waters” with the rhetorical support that EPA and the
Corps’ broad interpretations of the term metaphorically
make water of dry land.

II.

The Traditional Legal Meaning of
Navigable Waters

The legal concept of navigable waters originated in medieval England. The Crown owned the land beneath waters
used for navigation and the public had a common-law
right to use navigable waters for fishing and transport.21
We know this public right today as the navigable servitude. Upon independence, the American colonies succeeded to ownership of the beds beneath navigable waters,
subject to the common-law navigable servitude. As the
United States acquired new territories, it took ownership
of the beds beneath their navigable waters, again subject
to the common-law navigable servitude. When new states
were formed from those territories, ownership of the beds
beneath the navigable waters transferred to those states,
again subject to the navigable servitude.22
At the time that the 13 colonies formed the United States,
only waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide were considered navigable waters.23 This limited concept of navigability expanded to meet a growing and industrializing nation’s
needs for federal improvement and regulation of waterborne commerce and transportation. In Propeller Genesee v.
Fitzhugh,24 the Court held that navigable waters included
freshwater. Not long after, it held in Gibbons v. Ogden25 that
19. 79 Fed. Reg. 22188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014). The scientific support is provided at 79 Fed. Reg. 22222-52, but is referenced throughout the preamble.
20. For more information on EPA’s unitary theory of navigable waters and its
exemption of water transfers and diversions from §402, see Miller, Addition,
supra note 4, at 10781-94.
21. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 407-14 (1842), traces this history
back to the Magna Carta.
22. Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. 212 (1843). The U.S. Constitution did not grant
the shores of navigable waters and the soil beneath them to the United
States, impliedly reserving them to the states. New states have the same
rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over navigable waters as the original
states. This is known as the “equal footing” doctrine: New states are admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the original states. See also
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), in which the navigable
servitude gave rise to the public trust doctrine.
23. Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1845).
24. 53 U.S. 443 (1851).
25. 9 Wheat. 1; 21 U.S. 1 (1866).
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the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause26 conferred on
Congress authority to regulate interstate commerce, including the authority to regulate navigation. Finally, in The
Daniel Ball,27 it held that waters forming a highway or part
of a continuous highway of foreign or interstate commerce
were subject to Commerce Clause jurisdiction.
The Court has subsequently broadened Commerce
Clause jurisdiction to include waters that were once navigable, Economy Power & Light Co. v. United States28; waters
that presently are capable of use for navigation, The Monticello29; and waters that could be made navigable with reasonable improvements, United States v. Appalachian Electric
Power Co.30 The Court has also recognized that Commerce
Clause jurisdiction extends to tributaries of navigable waters
or even to entire watersheds, where necessary to accomplish
Commerce Clause-justified purposes; for example, flood
control, as in Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson.31
Traditional federal navigable water jurisdiction, therefore, extends to waters subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide; waters that are navigable in fact, or once were navigable
in fact, or could be made navigable in fact with reasonable
improvements; and, for some purposes, to their tributaries or watersheds. But this is somewhat simplified, because
it reflects an amalgam of decisions interpreting “navigable
waters” for different purposes: ownership of land beneath
navigable water; public rights to use navigable waters for
fishing and transportation; admiralty jurisdiction; and
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.32 Of these uses, the definition of navigable waters for the purpose of delineating land
ownership is, predictably, the most conservative, while the
definition for Commerce Clause jurisdiction is more flexible.33 Those differences are not significant for interpreting
navigable waters in the CWA, however, because, as discussed below, Congress intended that term to include all
waters within Congress’ constitutional authority.

III. Congressional Action: Statutory
Definition and Legislative History of
Navigable Waters
A.

Statutory Definition

Section 502(6) of the CWA defines navigable waters to
mean “the waters of the United States, including the ter26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 3.
10 Wall. 557; 77 U.S. 557 (1871).
256 U.S. 113, 123 (1921).
20 Wall. 430, 441-42; 87 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1874).
311 U.S. 377, 406 (1940).
313 U.S. 508 (1941).
For more information on these uses of navigable waters, see A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Water Rights and Resources (Clark Boardman
1988).
33. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 10 ELR 20042
(1979), in which a privately owned pond separated from an ocean bay by
a barrier beach became navigable water for purposes of Commerce Clause
navigational regulation under 33 U.S.C. §403 when the owners constructed a channel between the pond and the bay, but the private property did
not become subject to the navigational servitude for public access without
just compensation.

45 ELR 10551

ritorial seas.”34 As discussed above, the term “navigable
waters” has a well-established legal meaning. “The waters
of the United States,” on the other hand, has no well-established meaning. Congress defined the limited “navigable
waters” with the expansive “waters of the United States” to
extend the CWA’s jurisdiction to the constitutional limits
of congressional authority for water pollution control.
But wording the underlying element to suggest traditional linkage with waterborne commerce was an odd
way to accomplish expansiveness. The navigable waters
formulation of the element has caused and continues to
cause interpretive conflict. EPA and the Corps have promulgated detailed regulatory definitions of waters of the
United States, claiming a broad reach for jurisdiction
under the CWA.35 Indeed, EPA ultimately abandoned
reference to navigable waters, using waters of the United
States throughout its regulations, perhaps hoping that
others would forget the origin of the statute’s jurisdiction
in waterborne transportation. If so, it has not fooled the
Supreme Court, which has twice ruled that the government’s actions under §404 exceeded its statutory jurisdiction over navigable waters.36

B.

Legislative History

1.

Section 402

The CWA draws on two distinct statutory lineages, with
different pollution control strategies and different jurisdictional bases. These lineages have their origins in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) and the Refuse
Act. Congress enacted the FWPCA in 194837 and has since
amended it repeatedly.38 The FWPCA initially encouraged
and provided technical and financial support for state water
pollution control programs, as well as partial funding for
the construction of municipal sewage treatment facilities.
Its goal was to achieve state-established water quality standards.39 It evolved from providing a passive federal role to
establishing an active, although secondary, federal role.
Its strongest federal role was to abate interstate pollution,
assisting states in achieving their water quality standards
when they were unable to do so themselves because of pollution originating beyond their jurisdictions in other states.
34. 33 U.S.C. §1362(6).
35. 40 C.F.R. §122.2 (EPA); 33 C.F.R. §328.3 (Corps).
36. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006); Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC),
531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
37. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
38. FWPCA Amendment Acts: 66 Stat. 755 (1952); 70 Stat. 498 (1956);
Pub. L. No. 86-90, 73 Stat. 141 (1959); Pub. L. No. 86-624, 74 Stat. 411
(1960); Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204 (1960); Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79
Stat. 903 (1965); Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (1966); Pub. L. No.
91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970); Pub. L. No. 91-611, 84 Stat. 1818 (1970); Pub.
L. No. 92-50, 85 Stat. 124 (1971); Pub. L. No. 92-240, 85 Stat. 47 (1972).
39. For a description of the development of the program, see William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States: State,
Local and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972; Part II, 22 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 215
(2003); N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of
Water Quality, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 186, 432, 799 (1966/1967).
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Not surprisingly, the FWPCA’s jurisdictional basis was
“interstate waters.”40
On the other hand, the Refuse Act41 was enacted as part
of a revision of navigation laws in the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899.42 The Refuse Act protected navigation by
prohibiting the discharge of refuse into navigable waters
or their tributaries, except for flow from streets and sewers (that is, regulating industrial discharges but excluding
municipal discharges) without a permit from the Secretary
of the Army. Pursuant to a 1970 Executive Order,43 the
Corps and EPA adapted this statute for water pollution
control. The Corps processed applications for and issued
Refuse Act permits to industries discharging wastes to
navigable water, conditioned on the industries’ treatment
of the wastewater to achieve standards established by EPA
based on the technological treatment capabilities of different industrial categories. Not surprisingly, the Refuse Act’s
jurisdictional basis was “navigable waters.”
Environmentalists brought the Refuse Act Permit Program to a halt by winning a suit against the Corps to
require it to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)44 when issuing each of the thousands of
anticipated pollution control permits.45 In comprehensive
amendments to the FWPCA in 1972, Congress adopted
the permit program from the Refuse Act for all industrial
and municipal point sources of pollution. CWA permits
were to be conditioned on the permit holders meeting
both state-established water quality standards, originally
established under the FWPCA, and EPA-established technology-based standards under the CWA, much like those
EPA had established under the Corps/EPA Refuse Act permit program.46 The new statute exempted the issuance of
CWA §402 permits from compliance with NEPA, except
for permits to new sources,47 on the theory that for existing
sources CWA permits require reduction of existing pollution, to the benefit of the environment, while new sources
would add to existing pollution.
40. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965). Although EPA continues to include interstate waters in its definition of waters
of the United States, see 40 C.F.R. §122.1 (2013), and its proposed revision of that definition, see 79 Fed. Reg. 22188, 22267 (proposed Apr. 21,
2014), there is no explicit constitutional authority for Congress to regulate interstate waters unless they are also parts of the highways of interstate
commerce. Indeed, EPA identifies no such authority in its discussion of
jurisdiction over interstate waters in the preamble to its proposed amended
definition of navigable waters. See 79 Fed. Reg. at 22254-55. It has been
argued that such jurisdiction does not exist. See William Funk, 1 Law of
Environmental Protection §13:117 (2014). EPA, however, argues that
the Court inherently recognized Congress’ authority to regulate pollution
of interstate waters when it held in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
11 ELR 20406 (1981), that the CWA preempted the federal common law
of interstate water pollution. See EPA’s legal justification for its proposed
amendment of its definition of waters of the United States, 79 Fed. Reg.
22188, 22256-57.
41. Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §407.
42. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§401-148.
43. Exec. Order No. 11574, 3 C.F.R. §1966-70, 35 Fed. Reg. 19627 (Dec. 23,
1970). For a description of the program, see 42 Fed. Reg. 37122-23 (July
19, 1977).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370f, ELR Stat. NEPA §§2-209.
45. See Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 1 ELR 20637 (D.D.C. 1971).
46. 33 U.S.C. §§1311, 1342, CWA §§301, 402.
47. CWA §511(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. §1371(c)(1).
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The legislative history of the CWA is replete with statements that Congress intended the statute’s jurisdiction to
be expansive, indeed to reach the outer limits of congressional jurisdiction under the Constitution. Both houses
of Congress, however, used “navigable waters” as a jurisdictional element for their respective bills. The U.S. Senate bill defined navigable waters to mean “the navigable
waters of the United States, portions thereof, and the tributaries thereof, including the territorial seas and the Great
Lakes.”48 The U.S. House of Representatives bill defined it
to mean “the navigable waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”49 Insofar as both bills defined “navigable waters” as “navigable waters,” the definitions were
circular. The Committee Report accompanying the Senate
bill explained the rationale for the shift from the model of
the earlier FWPCA to the model of the Refuse Act:
Through a narrow interpretation of interstate waters the
implementation of the 1965 Act was severely limited.
Water moves in hydrological cycles and it is essential
that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source.
Therefore reference to the control requirements must
be made to the navigable waters, portions thereof, and
their tributaries.50

The Conference Committee changed the circular definitions of navigable waters in both bills to the present “waters
of the United States” and explained that “[t]he conferees
fully intend that the term ‘navigable waters’ be given the
broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or
may be made for administrative purposes.”51 Sen. Edmund
Muskie (D-Me.), widely credited as the author of the legislation, explained the Conference Committee bill to the
Senate as containing the “broadest possible constitutional
interpretation” of navigable waters.52 Rep. John Dingell
(D-Mich.), chief sponsor of the legislation in the House,
explained that the
conference bill defines the term “navigable waters” broadly
for water quality purposes . . . . It means “all of the waters
of the United States” in a geographical sense. It does not
mean “navigable waters of the United States” in a technical sense as we sometimes see it in some laws. This new
definition clearly encompasses all water bodies, including
48. S. 2770, 92nd Cong. §502(h) (1971), reprinted in 2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
[hereinafter Legis. History), at 1534, 1698.
49. H.R. 11896, 92nd Cong. §502(8) (1971), reprinted in 1 Legis. History,
supra note 48, at 1069.
50. S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 77 (1971), reprinted in 2 Legis. History, supra note
48, at 1419, 1495. The explanations that water moves in hydrological cycles
and that pollution must be treated at its source are not helpful. The hydrological cycle goes far beyond either navigable or interstate waters, encompassing groundwater beneath and water vapor in the clouds above Kansas.
Congress did not intend the CWA to regulate discharges to groundwater
and there is no hint in the statute itself or in its legislative history that Congress intended the CWA to reach water vapor in the clouds above Kansas.
51. S. Rep. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 327.
52. 118 Cong. Rec. S16876 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of Sen.
Muskie), reprinted in 1 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 166.
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main streams and their tributaries for water quality purposes. No longer are the old, narrow definitions of navigability, as determined by the Corps of Engineers, going to
govern matters covered by this bill.53

The repeated references to old, narrow determinations
of navigable waters referred to formal determinations the
Corps had made that particular waterways were navigable and therefore eligible for spending federal funds to
improve them.
This legislative history suggests that Congress made a
deliberate choice to base the CWA’s jurisdiction on navigable waters rather than on interstate waters because it
believed navigable waters jurisdiction to be broader.54 It also
indicates that Congress intended the CWA’s jurisdiction to
be as broad as constitutionally possible, encompassing “all
water bodies . . . including their tributaries.”55 Whether
the congressional choice of navigable waters jurisdiction
accomplished its expansive goals is questionable. Representative Dingell himself explained the reach of navigable
waters jurisdiction by describing judicial interpretation of a
term denoting waterborne commerce.56 And while the Senate Committee Report urged that the “Committee fully
intends that the term ‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible interpretation,” it prefaced that statement by
confessing that “[o]ne term that the Committee was reluctant to define was the term ‘navigable waters.’ The reluctance was based on the fear that any interpretation would
be read narrowly.”57 The Committee’s observation was not
initially justified, but ultimately proved prescient.
Congress’ choice of navigable waters jurisdiction for the
CWA appears not to extend to the full limits of Commerce
Clause jurisdiction, because navigable waters evokes only
the first of the three prongs of Commerce Clause jurisdiction
the Supreme Court enunciated in United States v. Lopez58:
(1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities substantially
affecting interstate commerce. With regard to the CWA’s
jurisdiction to regulate water pollution sources under the
§402 permit program, many polluting discharges are not
53. 118 Cong. Rec. H33756-57 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of Rep.
Dingell), reprinted in 1 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 250.
54. Congress was correct in this regard. The traditional definition of navigable
waters under the Commerce Clause does not distinguish between interstate and intrastate waterways, as long as an intrastate waterway is part of
a highway of foreign or interstate commerce. On the other hand, none of
the enumerated powers in the Constitution explicitly or inferentially grant
Congress the power to regulate interstate waters that are not highways or
parts of a highway of interstate or foreign commerce.
55. It could be argued, however, that abandoning “the tributaries” in the Senate bill’s definition of navigable waters narrowed the definition to exclude
tributaries. The more expansive definition from the Conference Committee, “waters of the United States,” coupled with the expansive language of
the Conference Committee Report and the expansive meanings attributed
to it by the sponsors on the House and Senate floors, however, rebut this
negative inference.
56. 118 Cong. Rec. H9114-35 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (House Consideration
of the Report of the Conference Committee), reprinted in 1 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 250.
57. S. Comm. on Pub. Works, Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, S. Rep. No. 92-911 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legis.
History, supra note 48, at 818.
58. 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
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to traditional navigable waters, but instead to waters that
are directly or indirectly tributary to traditional navigable
waters. An industrial discharge of pollutants, for instance,
may be to a ditch flowing into a small stream, which in
turn flows into a larger stream that eventually flows into a
navigable-in-fact river. An ordinary ditch59 is not a channel
of interstate commerce in the traditional sense, although a
discharge to the ditch might be considered an indirect discharge to navigable waters, because the tributaries to a navigable water in the aggregate contribute most of the flow of
that water as well as most of the pollutants discharged to it,
invoking either the first or third prong of Lopez.60
Municipal and industrial pollutants also might be considered instrumentalities of interstate commerce, analogous to liquid and solid wastes that the Court has held are
items in interstate commerce when they are transported on
interstate roadways, invoking the second prong of Lopez.61
Moreover, the discharge of pollutants to non-navigable
water, aggregated with other discharges to the same or
similar smaller waterways, can have adverse impact on the
navigable waters they eventually flow into, again implicating the Lopez third prong of Commerce Clause jurisdiction
and the Necessary and Proper Clause.62 Those arguments,
however, are beyond the scope of this Article, because it
interprets navigable waters in the CWA, not as a term of
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.63
Congressional choice of navigable waters as the CWA’s
jurisdictional basis implicitly limits its claim of jurisdiction
only to the first of the three Lopez prongs of Commerce
Clause jurisdiction, and that prong alone does not reach the
59. Writing the plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
735-36, 36 ELR 20116 (2006), Justice Antonin Scalia argues that a ditch
cannot be navigable water because a ditch is a “point source.” The §502(14)
definition of point source is a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,” and incorporates a list of inclusive examples, including “ditch.” He
argues that a ditch cannot be “navigable water” because it is already a “point
source” and the same thing cannot be two elements. Justice Scalia’s argument is a non sequitur, however. True, a ditch is a conveyance; it conveys
water, whether or not navigable, but often polluted. A ditch is not water and
therefore cannot be navigable water, although it can convey navigable water.
Justice Scalia has confused the issue by conflating a ditch with the water it
conveys, and conflating “point source” with “navigable waters.” Navigable
waters are distinct from their beds, a distinction that underlies the doctrine
that the public may use navigable water for fishing or transport, regardless
of who owns the land beneath the waters.
60. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 743, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
61. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 24 ELR 20815 (1994);
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 22 ELR 20909 (1992);
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 8 ELR 20540 (1978). The analogy is not perfect, because the transportation of municipal garbage to and
the disposal of it in landfills are compensable services, and hence traditional
interstate commerce, while dumping liquid wastes in navigable waters or
their tributaries is a free substitute for otherwise compensable services. That
implicates Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), extending Commerce
Clause jurisdiction to activities that would in themselves escape Commerce
Clause jurisdiction but for their aggregate effect on interstate commerce.
62. U.S. Const., art I, §8, cl. 18.
63. Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 19296, 31 ELR 20382 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting), joined by three other
Justices, outlined the case for Commerce Clause jurisdiction over isolated
ponds as habitat for migratory birds. Circuit courts had earlier reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209-11, 9
ELR 20757 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co.,
504 F.2d 1317, 1325-28, 4 ELR 20784 (6th Cir. 1974).
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outer limits of Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Congress
attempted to reach the outer limits of Commerce Clause
jurisdiction by defining “navigable waters” as the expansive “the waters of the United States” in CWA §502(7) and
by repeated pronouncements in the legislative history to
the effect that it intended to confer jurisdiction as broad
as constitutionally possible. Despite the initial willingness
of courts to interpret the term expansively, however, the
jurisdictional term is still “navigable waters” and textualist
jurists insist that “navigable” must have something to do
with floating commerce.64
The CWA’s definition of navigable waters as the waters
of the United States does not solve the problem, because
while “navigable waters” has an established meaning,
“waters of the United States” has no commonly understood meaning. Representative Dingell’s explanation that
waters of the United States is used in a geographical sense is
ambiguous. The term could include the water in the glasses
on our desks, the water vapor in the clouds above Kansas,
water 500 feet below the surface that never flows into surface water, or water on federal lands. “Waters of the United
States,” standing alone, might be interpreted to break out
of the first prong of the Lopez test to incorporate all three
prongs. But for textualist jurists, defining navigable waters
as waters of the United States does not abandon entirely the
concept of waterborne transportation in navigable waters,
because it evokes only the first prong of the Lopez test.
The issue is exacerbated by §404’s protection of wetlands, which EPA and the Corps interpret to include areas
that might be dry land part of the year. Dry land does
not appear to most people to be water, let alone navigable
water. The Court has fixated on this issue.65 Three of the
six Supreme Court decisions interpreting navigable water
were §404 cases,66 and the Court reached narrow interpretations of the term in two of those three decisions. These
narrow interpretations affect §402 pollution control cases,
where they raise the question of whether §402 governs
additions of pollutants to remote or intermittent tributaries
of navigable waters, in turn making it difficult to control
the pollution of indisputably navigable waters into which
these pollutants ultimately flow.67 If the CWA does not
64. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 734 (“The plain language of the statute simply
does not authorize the ‘Land is Water’ approach to federal jurisdiction.”);
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (“We cannot agree that Congress’ separate definitional use of the phrase ‘waters of the United States’ constitutes a basis for
reading the term ’navigable waters’ out of the Statute.”).
65. Id.
66. The six cases are Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Cont. Dist. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 710, 43 ELR 20004 (2013); Rapanos, 547 U.S.
715; South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S.
95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004); SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159; International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 17 ELR 20327 (1987); and United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 16 ELR 20086 (1985). Of
these six, Rapanos, SWANCC, and Riverside Bayview were all §404 decisions,
and form the focus of the Article’s discussion.
67. Compare United States v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007), decided after Rapanos, with United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345,
10 ELR 20184 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp.
Co., F.2d 1317, 4 ELR 20784 (6th Cir. 1974); and Sun Enters., Inc. v.
Train, 394 F. Supp. 1212 (C.D.N.Y. 1975), all decided before Riverside Bayview, the first Supreme Court CWA decision interpreting navigable water.
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provide the agencies with jurisdiction to stop additions of
pollutants to remote or intermittent tributaries of navigable
waters, it cannot stop those pollutants from flowing into
navigable waters, thwarting admitted congressional jurisdiction to control pollution of navigable waters.

2.

Section 404

The role of §404 in wetlands protection is obvious today,
but it was not obvious when Congress enacted the CWA in
1972. The initial §404 contained only §404(a)-(c), which
have scarcely been altered since.68 The word “wetland” did
not then and does not now appear in §404(a)-(c). Indeed,
the word wetland did not appear in the descriptions and
explanations of §404 in any of the committee reports
accompanying the House, Senate, or Conference Committee bills or in any of the congressional debates over the
bills leading to enactment of the 1972 legislation. A close
reading of §404(a)-(c) and its legislative history suggests
Congress intended to establish a program regulating the
disposal in open water of spoil from dredging rivers and
harbors for navigation maintenance, rather than a program regulating the filling of wetlands. Indeed, the legislative history demonstrates that is exactly what Congress
intended it to be.
Dredging is essential to waterborne commerce. Harbors and navigational channels must be dredged or they
will fill with silt and become impassable. Construction in
navigable waters also requires dredging bottom sediments
to make way for the foundations of bridges, jetties, and
other water-related structures. To carry out such activities,
vast quantities of bottom sediment, commonly known as
dredged spoil, must be removed and disposed. Existing
legislation prohibited dredging in navigable waters without
a Corps permit.69 As part of a permit for a dredging project, the Corps specified where and how the dredged spoil
generated by the project would be disposed.
As a result of NEPA70 and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,71 the Corps increasingly took environmental concerns into account in dredged spoil disposal
decisions.72 Rather than designating individual disposal
sites for each project, the Corps began to designate
regional sites that could be used for multiple dredging

68.
69.
70.

71.
72.

All four circuit court decisions involved discharges to remote tributaries,
flowing through several intermediary tributaries to navigable water.
Compare Pub. L. No. 92-500, §404, 86 Stat. 816, 884 (1972), with 33
U.S.C. §1344 (2006).
33 U.S.C. §403.
See 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370h. NEPA requires federal agencies to consider
environmental impacts when taking actions. Indeed, when an agency takes
a major federal action, it must produce an environmental impact statement
disclosing the environmental consequences of proposed action and alternative actions.
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S. C. §§661-666. This statute
requires federal agencies taking actions that will alter a water body to consult
with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) to preserve wildlife resources.
See Want, supra note 16, at §2.02[1]. The Corps’ “public interest review”
began in 1968, when it began to take environmental and public interest
factors into account in issuing permits. See 33 C.F.R. §209.120(d). For
a description of one such disposal project, see American Dredging Co. v.
Dutchshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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projects in an area, thereby limiting the number of environmental reviews required for disposal areas. Hence,
the Corps has authority to issue discharge permits “at
specified disposal sites” in §404(a). Although dredged
spoil could be disposed on land, it was more feasible to
dispose of this semi-solid ooze in open water, including the ocean.73 Hence, EPA has authority in §404(b) to
develop guidelines for the Corps to use in designating
“each such disposal site.” While environmental advocates were only becoming aware of environmental concerns from the disposal of dredged spoil in open waters,
maritime interests were acutely aware that delays in the
use of disposal sites would interrupt dredging necessary
for maritime commerce.
The legislative history of §404 reflected a policy conflict between prevention of water pollution and promotion of waterborne commerce. The Senate bill, S. 2770,
the primary model for much of the CWA, contained no
§404, but instead treated dredged spoil as just another
pollutant subject to the §402 permit program.74 Senators
proposed an amendment in the Public Works Committee
to authorize the Corps rather than EPA to regulate the
disposal of dredged spoil, but the Committee rejected the
amendment.75 In the Senate debate on S. 2770, Sen. Allen
Ellender (D-La.) asserted that “strict adherence to the
published standards [for pollution control] would result
in 90 per cent of the ports and harbors of the United
States being closed, until such time as land disposal areas
are provided. This would create a catastrophic situation
with respect to our foreign and domestic commerce.” 76
Senator Muskie, tacitly acknowledging the problem,77
offered an amendment to the Senate bill adding §402(m),
which basically required EPA to issue permits for the discharge of dredged material certified by the Corps unless
EPA found that the disposal would adversely affect water
supplies, fisheries, shellfish beds, and so forth. The Senate
adopted this amendment.78
Maritime interests had greater success in the House. The
House bill authorized the Corps to issue permits for the
discharge of “dredged or fill material” where it would not
unreasonably affect human health or the environment.79
Although it required the Corps to apply EPA guidelines
for such discharge, it allowed the Corps to disregard the
guidelines if there was no economically feasible alternative
reasonably available.80 Again, the concern was that “until
73. See 1 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 177-78.
74. S. 2770, 92nd Cong. §§402, 504(f ) (1971), reprinted in 2 Legis. History,
supra note 48, at 1534, 1685, 1697.
75. S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 92 (rollcall votes during Committee consideration),
id. at 1415, 1509.
76. 117 Cong. Rec. S. 2770 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971) (statement of Sen. Ellender), id. at 1386-88.
77. After all, he was a senator from Maine, where Portland is one of the most
active ports on the East Coast because it receives oil tankers offloading cargo
for transfer by pipeline to Canada.
78. 117 Cong. Rec. S. 2770 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971), reprinted in 2 Legis.
History, supra note 48, at 1392-93.
79. H.R. 11896, reprinted in 1 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 1063.
80. H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 130 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legis. History, supra
note 48, at 816.
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such time as economic and feasible alternative methods are
available, no arbitrary or unreasonable restrictions shall be
imposed on dredging activities essential for the maintenance of interstate and foreign commerce.”81 The wording
of the Conference Committee Report underlined congressional intention to deal with spoil from dredging to maintain navigation. Thus “specific spoil” was to be deposited at
a site; the section dealt with the “disposal of dredged spoil”;
and advancing technology would eventually end the need
for “dumping dredged spoil” in water.82
The relationship between CWA §§403 and 404 underscores that §404 was aimed at open-water disposal of spoil
from dredging rivers and harbors. Section 403(c) required
EPA to develop guidelines to protect human health and
welfare and marine life and diversity, from the discharge
of pollutants into the territorial seas, contiguous zone, and
ocean. Section 404(b) forbade the issuance of a §404 permit not meeting the §403 guidelines unless the “economic
impact of the site on navigation and anchorage” (emphasis added) outweighs compliance with the guidelines. The
§403 criteria are designed to protect marine waters and are
irrelevant to filling wetlands, again suggesting that Congress intended §404 to regulate the open-water disposal
of spoil from dredging rivers and harbors rather than filling wetlands. The Corps’ authority to override EPA’s criteria because of their economic impact on navigation and
anchorage reiterates the section’s purpose to address spoil
from dredging for navigation purposes.
Nevertheless, §404(a)-(c) authorized the Corps to regulate the discharge of “dredged or fill material” (emphasis
added) into navigable waters. The entire wetlands protection tilt of CWA §404 derives from the inclusion of fill
material in §404. That term, however, is at best ambiguous
in addressing protection of wetlands from landfilling activities. Fill material could mean material to fill abutments,
jetties, and other marine structures, but it has come to
include material removed from high elevations in a wetland
and then redeposited at lower elevations in the same wetland, thus converting it to fast land. The term originated
in H.R. 11896, §404, which provided that discharges of
dredged or fill material “will not unreasonably degrade or
endanger . . . the marine environment,” (emphasis added)
evidencing legislative intent to deal with dredged spoil disposed in marine waters rather than filling wetlands. The
Report accompanying the bill expressed the intent of the
House Committee on Public Works that the Corps “shall
act promptly on the dredging permits essential for the
maintenance of interstate commerce,”83 emphasizing the
same intent to regulate the dredging of navigable channels. The absence of congressional intent to regulate filling
of wetlands in §404 is also evident from the disconnect
between “fill” and “pollutant” in the CWA; the definition

81. Id. at 817.
82. 1 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 117, 236, 177.
83. H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 129-30 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legis. History,
supra note 48, at 816-17.
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of pollutant in §502(6) includes dredged spoil, but does
not mention fill or dredged or fill material.84
Even when the Corps first promulgated regulations to
administer §404, the program it described was for disposing of dredged spoil from maintaining navigational
waterways. Although those regulations acknowledged the
importance of wetlands, the only wetland protections the
regulations anticipated was care in discharging dredged
spoil from navigational maintenance into wetlands.
Indeed, the Corps did not include wetlands in its definitions of navigable waters.85 EPA’s initial regulatory definition of navigable water did not mention wetlands either.86
Section 404 is so associated with wetlands protection today that its original goal to facilitate navigational
dredging is forgotten or altogether unknown. The considerable legislative history expressing concern that §404 not
interfere with the maintenance of navigation or anchorage
and the complete absence of legislative concern that §404
not interfere with agriculture and development, points
directly at disposal of spoil from navigational dredging,
rather than filling wetlands, as the focus of §404. Even
the story told by the Corps’ general counsel when the
agency began to administer the section to protect wetlands acknowledges that the section was not designed to
protect wetlands from landclearing.87
While protection of wetlands contributes to the control
of pollution in navigable waters and provides other environmental and economic benefits, such a significant expansion of a statute’s jurisdiction would not ordinarily be made
without notice to both legislative chambers. Yet, there was
no such notice in any of the following: the draft legislation; reports of the House Public Works Committee, Senate Public Works Committee, or Conference Committee;
debates on the bills in either chamber; or the explanations
of the Conference Committee’s actions to either the House
or the Senate. The omissions in this legislative history raise
significant questions on the legitimacy of the entire initial
wetlands protection orientation of EPA and the Corps’ initial wetlands protection program under §404.

84. This omission does not affect the reach of the section’s jurisdiction, because
most fill material is composed wholly or partially of material defined as a
pollutant in §502(6); for example, sand or rock. See Miller, Pollutant, supra
note 7, at 10974-77.
85. The Corps’ proposed regulations addressed “policy, practice and procedures
. . . in connection with [the Corps’] performance of Federal dredging projects.” 39 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 19, 1974) (emphasis added). The final regulations addressed those policies, practices, and procedures “in connection
with . . . the review of Federal projects performed by the Corps of Engineers
which involve the disposal of dredged material in navigable water.” 39 Fed.
Reg. 26635 (July 22, 1974) (emphasis added). Both required the Corps to
consider the “effect on wetlands” of proposed projects, 39 Fed. Reg. 6114,
26637, but neither mentioned wetlands outside of that narrow paragraph.
These regulations dealt only with “Federal dredging projects.” The Corps
traditionally had conducted projects to dredge navigable channels and harbors. Private landclearing activities to convert wetlands to other uses are not
“Federal dredging projects.”
86. 40 C.F.R. §125.1(o), 38 Fed. Reg. 13528, 13529 (May 22, 1973).
87. See Charles D. Abalard & Charles Boru O’Neill, Wetlands Protection and
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, 1 Vt.
L. Rev. 51 (1975), at 71-74.
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In 1977, Congress enacted a set of “mid-course correction” amendments to the CWA.88 One of the chief controversies in the congressional deliberations was over the
scope of §404. Farming and development interests, asleep
at the switch when Congress enacted §404 in 1972, now
launched a coordinated effort to scale back the scope of
regulations on filling wetlands. While interest regarding
§404 during the enactment of the 1972 legislation was
focused entirely on allowing disposal of spoil from dredging rivers and harbors to maintain navigation, interest
regarding §404 during the 1977 legislation was focused
entirely on the scope of regulation on filling wetlands to
promote agriculture and development.89 Although efforts
for significant reductions in the jurisdiction of the program were unsuccessful, considerable accommodations
to agricultural and development interests were adopted,90
increasing the section to more than nine times its original
length.91 The depth of attention to §404 in 1977 suggests
that if Congress had been aware in 1972 that the section
could be used to regulate filling of wetlands, at least some
legislative attention would have been devoted to wetlands
in 1972.

IV.

Administrative Action: Regulatory
Definitions of Navigable Waters and
Wetlands

A.

Navigable Waters

Although EPA implements the CWA §402 permit program
for the discharge of pollutants, EPA and the Corps share
administration of the CWA §404 program for the discharge of dredged or fill material. Pursuant to §404(a) &
(s), the Corps issues §404 permits and enforces against violations of the section. EPA, however, supervises the Corps’
conduct of the program. Pursuant to §404(b), EPA issues
guidelines that the Corps must follow in deciding whether
to issue and how to condition permits; under §404(c),
EPA may veto Corps-proposed permits as contrary to the
requirements of the CWA; and it is authorized by §404(n)
to enforce against the discharge of dredged or fill material
without a §404 permit or in violation of the terms of a
§404 permit. In §404(g), Congress also gave EPA authority to approve state programs to administer §404 in place
of the Corps, except in traditionally navigable waters; and
in §404(i), Congress authorized the Agency to withdraw
approval if a state no longer meets the requirements for
approval. Both EPA and the Corps have promulgated regu88. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 43, 9 ELR 20284 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
89. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1556 (1977). See H.R. Rep. No. 95-139
(1977), reprinted in 4 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 1195, 1215-20;
and additional views of Reps. Robert Edgar and John Myers, id. at 1247-51.
90. Pub. L. No. 95-217, §67(a) & (b), 91 Stat. 1556, 1600-06 (1977).
91. Subsections 404(a)-(c) have changed little since their enactment in 1972.
All the following subsections were added later. In the 2006 edition of the
U.S. Code, §404 occupies nine page-long columns, of which §404(a)-(c)
occupies less than one column. See id. at 950-54.
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latory definitions of navigable waters92; moreover, each has
promulgated two definitions of the term, one for use only
under §404, and one for use under other programs that the
agencies administer.93
Prior to the CWA’s enactment, the Corps had promulgated a regulatory definition of navigable waters for use in
all of its water-related programs, reflecting the traditional
judicial interpretation of “navigable waters.” A few weeks
prior to the statute’s enactment, the Corps amended that
definition to reflect extensive, up-to-date research on judicial interpretation of the term: “those waters of the United
States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,
and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or may be
in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate
or foreign commerce.”94 The Corps continued to use that
definition under §404.95
EPA’s initial definition of navigable waters, adopted for
the §402 permit program, expanded it beyond the traditional judicial interpretation to include: (1) tributaries of
navigable waters; (2) interstate waters; and (3) intrastate
waters (a) used by interstate travelers for recreation and
other purposes, (b) from which fish or shellfish are taken
and sold in interstate commerce, or (c) utilized for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce.96 But
that definition made no mention of wetlands. Shortly
thereafter, EPA promulgated interim final guidelines under
§404(b)(1), including a definition of navigable waters that
did not mention wetlands or tributaries, but incorporated
by reference the Corps’ general definition of navigable
waters.97 EPA’s guidelines, however, stated that destruction of wetlands was one of the most egregious results of
discharges of dredged and fill material.98 Although the
interim final nature of the guidelines invited comments
and promised revisions if warranted by the comments, EPA
did not revise the guidelines for several years. When the
Agency did revise, it adopted the definition it had subsequently developed for “waters of the United States” under
§402, including tributaries and adding wetlands adjacent
to other waters of the United States.99
The significant differences between the Corps and
EPA’s initial definitions of navigable waters were contrary
to the interpretive canon that words are interpreted con92. Compare 40 C.F.R. §122.2 (EPA definition), with 33 C.F.R. §328.3
(Corps definition).
93. EPA’s 40 C.F.R. §122.2 definition applies to the §402 permit program
and its 40 C.F.R. §230.3 definition applies to the §404 permit program.
The Corps’ 33 C.F.R. §328 definition applies to the §404 permit program
and its 33 C.F.R. §329 definition applies to the programs it administers in
aid of navigation.
94. Abalard & O’Neill, supra note 87, at 65. See also 37 Fed. Reg. 18289 (Sept.
9, 1972).
95. See the Corps’ initial regulations under §404 at 33 C.F.R. §209.145(d)(1)
(1975), 39 Fed. Reg. 26635, 26637 (July 22, 1974). In that definition of
navigable waters, the Corps referenced and incorporated the more-detailed
definition it had earlier developed for all its water-related programs, then
contained in 33 C.F.R. §209.260. Neither definition mentioned wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters or tributaries of navigable waters.
96. 40 C.F.R. §125.1(p) (1974).
97. 40 C.F.R. §230.2(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 41292-93 (Sept. 5, 1975).
98. 40 C.F.R. §320.4-1(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 41292, 41294 (Sept. 5, 1975).
99. 45 Fed. Reg. 85340, 85346 (Dec. 24, 1980).
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sistently throughout a statute unless the statute explicitly required otherwise. The introductory phrase in CWA
§502, “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, when
used in this chapter . . .” a term, e.g., “navigable waters,”
reiterates the canon. Nothing in the CWA specifically provides that the term navigable waters has different meanings in §§402 and 404. The differences between EPA and
the Corps’ initial regulatory definitions of navigable water
reflected the Corps’ historical authority to make improvements in aid of navigation, covering traditional Commerce Clause highways of commerce jurisdiction; and
EPA’s recent mission to reduce water pollution in all of
the nation’s waters, reaching beyond traditional highways
of commerce jurisdiction. The difference led to confusion
and conflict within the executive branch and between the
executive branch and the interested publics.
Both EPA and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
believed that the Corps’ initial definition of navigable
waters was too narrow, particularly with regard to its failure to include wetlands, and they unsuccessfully urged
the Corps to expand its definition. Environmental advocates won an early case challenging the Corps’ regulations
as too narrow, particularly because they did not include
wetlands.100 The Corps was dissatisfied with DOJ’s representation in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway
because DOJ agreed with EPA; accordingly, DOJ allowed
the Corps to present its views to the district court.101 Finding with little analysis that Congress intended to confer
in the CWA “federal jurisdiction over the nations’ waters
to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution,” the court ordered the Corps to
promulgate a more expansive definition.102 That, plus some
nudging by DOJ,103 led the Corps to promulgate a definition of navigable waters parallel to EPA’s, but including
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.104 The Corps began
a practice of publishing two definitions of navigable waters,
one for all of its water-related programs except for §404,
and another for §404. It continues that practice today.105
EPA’s initial regulations defined and used “navigable
waters” and did not define or use “waters of the United
States.”106 In 1980 amendments to its regulations, EPA
ceased defining navigable waters or using that term;
instead, the Agency defined and used the term waters of
the United States.107 EPA explained it did so “for the same
100. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 5 ELR
20285 (D.D.C. 1975). See also Abalard & O’Neil, supra note 87, at 63,
n.68.
101. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685.
102. Id. at 686.
103. DOJ issued an opinion stating that EPA rather than the Corps had authority to interpret the term navigable waters in §404 because EPA administers
the entire CWA, which is premised on navigable waters jurisdiction, while
the Corps’ role is limited to implementing §404, and the CWA authorizes
EPA to oversee the Corps’ administration of §404. See 43 U.S. Op. Atty.
Gen. 197 (Sept. 5, 1979).
104. See Want, supra note 16, at §2.02[3].
105. 33 C.F.R. §328 (definition for the §404 program), 33 C.F.R. §329 (definition for other Corps programs).
106. 45 Fed. Reg. 33290, 33298 (May 19, 1980).
107. Id. at 33424.
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reason that [“the waters of the United States”] is used
in the Clean Water Act: the Act covers much more than
waters that are traditionally ‘navigable.’”108 The Corps’ regulations under §404 also switched from defining navigable
waters to defining waters of the United States.109 Neither
EPA nor the Corps can amend the CWA to eliminate navigable waters from its text. Perhaps, the agencies hoped that
if they began to articulate the jurisdictional basis of the
CWA exclusively as waters of the United States rather than
navigable waters, the world would follow. In any event, the
Supreme Court did not.
As currently framed, EPA’s regulatory definition of the
waters of the United States means: (a) traditionally navigable waters; (b) interstate waters, including wetlands;
(c) other waters110 whose “use, degradation or destruction
would . . . or could affect interstate or foreign commerce”111;
(d) impoundments of waters identified in (a)-(c); (e) tributaries of waters identified in (a)-(c); (f) the territorial sea;
and (g) wetlands adjacent to waters identified in (a)-(f).
The definition excludes “waste treatment systems, including treatments ponds or lagoons designed to meet the
requirements of the CWA.”112
This definition was promulgated prior to the Supreme
Court’s decisions in SWANCC and Rapanos. Subsequently, EPA and the Corps eventually issued a guidance document interpreting waters of the United States
in light of those decisions, and followed with proposed
revisions of the regulatory definitions.113 The proposed
definitions are not identical to the guidance, but are
largely based on it. Rather than describing the guidance, this Article analyzes the proposed regulations as
the EPA’s latest interpretation of the jurisdictional term.
The proposed definitions114 would include (a) traditionally navigable waters; (b) interstate waters, including
interstate wetlands; (c) the territorial seas; (d) impoundments of navigable waters identified elsewhere in the
definition; (e) tributaries of navigable waters identified
in (a) through (c); (f) waters, including wetlands, adja108. Id. at 33298.
109. Compare 33 C.F.R. §209.145(d)(1), 39 Fed. Reg. 26635, 26637 (July 22,
1974), with 33 C.F.R. §328.3 (2013).
110. Including “intrastate lakes, rivers streams (including intermittent streams),
mudflats, sandflats, ‘wetlands,’ sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds.”
111. The definition includes the following uses as potentially affecting interstate
commerce: (1) use by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other
activities; (2) harvesting fish or shellfish for sale in interstate or foreign commerce; and (3) use or industrial purposes by industries in interstate or foreign commerce.
112. But “the exclusion applies only to manmade bodies of water which neither
were originally created in waters of the United States [ ] nor resulted from
the impoundment of waters of the United States.”
113. The guidance document can be found at http://water.epa/gov/lawsregs/
guidance/wetlands/CWAwaters.efm. The proposed regulation appears at 79
Fed. Reg. 22188, 22267-68 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014).
114. The proposal would amend 10 different EPA and Corps regulations with
identical or substantially identical definitions of navigable waters or waters of the United States. See 33 C.F.R. §328.3, 40 C.F.R. §§110.1, 112.2,
116.3, 117.9(i), 122.2, 230.3(s) & (t), 232.2, 300.5, 300 Appendix E to
Part 300, 3.2.3 and 401.11, 79 Fed. Reg. 22188, 22262-74. References
in this Article are to proposed amendments to 40 C.F.R. §122.2, EPA’s
primary definition of waters of the United States, from which most of the
other amendments are derived.
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cent to waters identified in (a) through (e); and (g) on a
case-by-case basis other waters that, alone or aggregated
with similarly situated waters, have a “significant nexus”
to waters identified elsewhere in the definition. The proposal adds definitions of “adjacent” and “tributary” and
provides that wetlands can be tributaries. Finally, EPA
provides scientific justifications for its definitions, especially of adjacency and tributaries.115 (EPA’s current and
proposed definitions are set forth in Appendix I.)
The proposal makes the most aggressive claim of jurisdiction possible for tributaries and wetlands after the two
Supreme Court decisions. But it drops any claim of jurisdiction over discharges to groundwater. And it disclaims
jurisdiction over waters because they are used for fishing
and recreation or other activities affecting or potentially
affecting interstate or foreign commerce. The proposal and
its effects will be analyzed as they impact the categories of
water discussed below.

B.

Wetlands

EPA defines wetlands as “areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted
for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.”116 The
Corps’ definition is similar.117 The EPA/Corps’ proposed
amendment of the definition of waters of the United States
defines wetlands in the same manner.118 But the Corps and
EPA went much further to develop a Wetlands Delineation
Manual, detailing the types of soils and vegetation that are
typical of saturated soil conditions.119 Avoyelles Sportsmen’s
League, Inc. v. Marsh provides a good example of a hotly
contested delineation.120

V.

Judicial Interpretation of Navigable
Waters Under the CWA

Because courts have had no difficulty in finding that discharges into traditionally navigable water, such as tidal
water,121 the territorial seas,122 and major inland waterways123 are within the jurisdiction of the CWA, this Article
will not discuss such decisions. Instead, it will focus on
areas of controversy. Most decisions interpreting navigable
waters have arisen in five contexts: (1) remote or dry tribu115. 79 Fed. Reg. 22188, 22222-52 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014).
116. 40 C.F.R. §122.2 (2013).
117. 33 C.F.R. §328.3.
118. 79 Fed. Reg. 22268(c)(6).
119. For the history of the Wetlands Delineation Manual, see Want, supra note
16, at §4.09.
120. 715 F.2d 897, 13 ELR 20942 (5th Cir. 1983).
121. United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 39 ELR 20232 (9th Cir. 2009)
(expansion of jurisdiction above mean high tide). See also Want, supra note
16, at 2-9 & n.1082; Abalard & O’Neill, supra note 87, at 85.
122. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 19 ELR 20225 (9th Cir.
1998).
123. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1866).
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taries; (2) wetlands; (3) isolated waters; (4) groundwater;
and (5) unitary navigable water.
The tributary and wetlands decisions are often intertwined and are analyzed together because to be within
the jurisdiction of the CWA to reach the full extent of
Congress, wetlands must be adjacent to navigable waters,
often tributaries of traditionally navigable water. The
Corps established the adjacency requirement in its regulations.124 No court has explicitly suggested a statutory
or constitutional requirement of adjacency, apart from this
regulation, although the suggestion may be inherent in the
Rapanos plurality’s analysis.125 Thus, whether a wetland
is within CWA jurisdiction often depends on whether an
adjacent tributary is navigable; accordingly, many decisions on the navigability of tributaries are §404 decisions.
The lower courts’ decisions on whether tributaries and
wetlands are within the CWA’s jurisdiction usually reflect
the latest Supreme Court decision on the subject. This
Article, therefore, considers tributary and wetlands decisions together and organizes them by reference to the latest
preceding Supreme Court decision on the CWA’s navigable
water jurisdiction.
Prior to any Supreme Court decision interpreting navigable waters in the CWA, the lower courts followed the
admonition of the CWA’s legislative history to interpret
the jurisdictional reach of the CWA to the extent of Congress’ constitutional jurisdiction over waters of the United
States. Lower courts interpreted the term broadly to extend
to the following: primary tributaries, flowing directly
into traditionally navigable waters; very remote tributaries, flowing eventually into traditionally navigable waters
through a series of intermediate tributaries; and their adjacent wetlands. These expansive interpretations by the lower
courts continued after Riverside Bayview,126 the Supreme
Court’s first CWA decision interpreting §404 or navigable
waters under the CWA. In that decision, the Court held
that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters were within the jurisdiction of the CWA. The
decision did not define which tributaries were within the
CWA’s jurisdiction, but the tributaries at issue were remote
and the decision suggested an expansive interpretation of
navigable waters.
The Court’s next §404 decision, SWANCC,127 did not
deal with wetlands or tributaries, but held that isolated
waters were not navigable, signaling that there is a limit
to the jurisdictional reach of “navigable waters.” After
SWANCC, a few lower courts began to narrow their interpretations of navigable waters, but only a few. Rapanos,128
the Court’s latest §404 decision, dealt directly with wetlands and tributaries of navigable waters and did so in a
restrictive manner. Because the Court could not muster a
124. 33 C.F.R. §209(d)(2((i)(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 31324 (1975).
125. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
126. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 16 ELR
20086 (1985).
127. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
128. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
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majority opinion, Rapanos’ precedential value is uncertain;
as a result, lower courts have spent much of their interpretive energies deciphering how to apply it. Nevertheless,
lower courts have narrowed their interpretations of navigable water to varying degrees, sometimes startlingly so.
Courts have fairly consistently held that isolated waters
are not navigable. Although courts also have fairly consistently held that groundwater is not navigable, some have
held that when a defendant adds pollutants to groundwater
that flows into a nearby navigable water or its tributary,
the groundwater is navigable, a proposition that has not
been retested since Rapanos in 2006 and that may have
difficulty surviving that decision. EPA’s proposed redefinition of waters of the United States excludes groundwater.129
EPA’s “unitary navigable waters” theory is raised at various
points, but is particularly relevant to the Agency’s water
transfer rule and will be discussed in conjunction with that
rule. Water diversions and transfers raise particular problems in the context of navigable waters.130

A.

Tributaries and Wetlands

The Supreme Court’s traditional interpretation of Commerce Clause authority to regulate activities on navigable
waters did not include tributaries or wetlands unless they
independently meet the criteria for navigable waters. But
the Court also has recognized that federally authorized
activities on navigable waters, such as flood control, often
can be accomplished only if they also take place on nonnavigable tributaries to navigable waters. Indeed, the Court
recognized the necessity of and constitutional permissibility of a watershed approach to flood control,131 an extension
of Commerce Clause jurisdiction authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause.132 Congress could not perform
its Commerce Clause authority to promote and protect
interstate and foreign commerce, including waterborne
commerce, from flooding without flood control projects
on non-navigable tributaries of navigable water.

1.

Tributaries

Because the protection of navigable waters from pollution
requires the protection of their tributaries from pollution,
it is logical that the CWA’s definition of navigable waters
includes their tributaries. If the CWA does not control
the addition of pollutants to the tributaries of a navigable
water, pollutants added to those tributaries will flow into
and pollute the navigable water, making it impossible for
the CWA to control the pollution of traditionally navigable waters. Congress recognized this when it enacted
the Refuse Act, prohibiting the deposit of refuse “into any
navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary
of any navigable water from which the same shall float or
129. 79 Fed. Reg. 22188, 22268 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014). The proposed rule
would be codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.2(b)(5)(vi), Waters of the United States.
130. See Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10780-94.
131. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
132. U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 18.
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be washed into such navigable water.”133 It also forbade the
deposit of refuse on the banks of navigable waters or their
tributaries from which it “is liable to be washed into” navigable waters.
The drafters of the CWA were equally aware of the need
to make tributaries of navigable waters subject to CWA
jurisdiction. The Senate bill did so explicitly. Although the
final statute does not mention tributaries in its definition
of navigable waters as the waters of the United States, that
definition is at least expansive enough to cover tributaries. The congressional explanations of “navigable waters”
accompanying the enactment of the CWA describe it as
reaching far beyond its traditional meaning, to reach the
limits of Congress’ jurisdiction over water, and many specify that it includes tributaries.
Assuming that tributaries of navigable waters are within
the jurisdiction of the CWA, however, the question becomes
which tributaries? The primary tributaries, the creeks that
flow into the navigable river? The secondary tributaries,
the streams that flow into the creeks? The tertiary tributaries? The trickles of water that eventually flow into the
most remote stream, but only after rainfall events? Does
it make a difference whether an identifiable drop of water
from the trickle eventually flows into navigable water or if
an identifiable molecule of a pollutant added to that trickle
does? Justice Antonin Scalia warns that expanding the
interpretation of navigable waters to include those trickles
may “engulf entire cities and immense arid wastelands. In
fact, the entire land area of the United States lies in some
drainage basin, and an endless network of visible channels
furrows the entire surface, containing water ephemerally
whenever rain falls.”134 He is correct in asserting that this
is not what Congress intended. On the other hand, as he
acknowledges, Congress did not intend to confine CWA
jurisdiction to traditionally navigable waters. Alas, legal
decisions are often exercises in line-drawing where there
are no obvious places to draw lines.
EPA’s proposed amendments to its definition of “waters
of the United States” include a definition of “tributary” as “a
water physically characterized by the presence of a bed and
banks and ordinary high water mark . . . which contributes
flow, either indirectly or through another water,” to a water
otherwise defined as “a water of the United States.” The
Agency’s proposed definition specifies that wetlands, lakes,
and ponds can be tributaries; and that a tributary does not
lose its status as such because of natural or man-induced
interruptions, such as underground flows, impoundments,
or canals.135 The areas encompassed in the proposed definition seem to stop short of Justice Scalia’s parade of horribles,
but it does not tell us exactly how far short. How much of a
bank or bed is necessary? EPA’s failure to provide a complete
133. 33 U.S.C. §407. Discharge of refuse into a tributary of navigable water
violated the statute even in the absence of proof that the refuse eventually
flowed into navigable waters, when it was likely to have done so. See United
States. v. American Cyanamid Co., 480 F.2d 1132, 3 ELR 20656 (2d Cir.
1973).
134. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
135. 79 Fed. Reg. 22268 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.2(c)(5)).
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and succinct answer to Justice Scalia’s concerns is a disappointing aspect of its rulemaking to date.

2.

Wetlands

The traditional definition of navigable waters did not
include wetlands as such. The Corps’ first regulatory definition of navigable waters did not include wetlands,136 nor
did EPA’s.137 After Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Callaway138 overturned the Corps’ regulations as too narrow, the Corps promulgated new regulations substantially
expanding its definition of navigable waters, most notably
including wetlands adjacent to coastal or inland navigable
waters,139 and EPA followed suit.

3.

Pre-Riverside Bayview Decisions

Twenty-nine of the 108 (27%) lower court decisions interpreting navigable waters under the CWA in the context
of tributaries or wetlands were decided before the first
Supreme Court decision on §404 and wetlands, Riverside
Bayview,140 issued in 1985. All but one of those 29 decisions (that is, 97%) decided that the waters at issue were
navigable; the one negative decision was based on unusual
equities rather than reflecting a narrow interpretation of
navigable waters.141
One of the decisions was in a challenge by environmental groups to the Corps’ initial regulations claiming
jurisdiction under §404 only for discharges to traditionally
navigable waters. The court issued a terse decision ordering
the Corps to promulgate a more expansive definition of
navigable waters.142 Once the Corps did so, Wyoming and
Puerto Rico unsuccessfully challenged its more expansive
regulations as intruding on their jurisdictions over intrastate or intra-commonwealth waters.143

a.

Tributaries

No decisions during this period held that a stream, lake,
or other tributary was not navigable. Six of the deci136. 33 C.F.R. §209.102(d)(1) (1975).
137. 40 C.F.R. §125.1(p) (1975).
138. 392 F. Supp. 685, 5 ELR 20285 (D.D.C. 1975).
139. 33 C.F.R. §209.120(d)(2)(b) & (h), 40 Fed. Reg. 31320, 31324 (July 25,
1975).
140. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 16 ELR
20086 (1985). See tbls. A & B at the end of the Article. In using tbl. B to
confirm this and other calculations in the text or to make your own calculations, beware that the groupings of lower court decisions between Supreme
Court decisions include more than just tributary and wetlands cases. For
instance, the pre-Riverside Bayview groupings of circuit and district court
decisions include 33 decisions, of which 29 are tributary or wetlands cases.
141. See tbl. B. The one exception is United States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d
464, 15 ELR 20177 (8th Cir. 1984). The Corps’ own dredging and disposal
of dredge spoil created a wetland on private property, where there had been
no wetland before. The court viewed it as inequitable that the Corps could
expand its jurisdiction by its own activities.
142. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685.
143. Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114, 8 ELR 20001 (D. Wyo. 1977);
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Alexander, 438 F. Supp. 90, 7 ELR 20751
(D.D.C. 1977).
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sions held that tributaries were navigable. Three of those
decisions held that discharges to small streams, entering navigable water only after flowing through four or
five intermediaries, were discharges to waters of the
United States.144 A fourth held that discharges to a normally dry arroyo, flowing eventually to navigable waters
only after heavy rainfall, were to waters of the United
States.145 Two more held that discharge to canals leading
to navigable water were to waters of the United States.146
Although a 2,000- to 3,000-acre lake was not connected
to other navigable water, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held it to be navigable because interstate travelers used it for recreational boating.147 Finally,
another decision held that a small stream that began and
ended in a single county was a water of the United States
because it was used to produce agricultural crops sold in
interstate commerce.148

b.

Wetlands

Most of the decisions during this period were in §404 cases
where landowners argued that their wetlands were not navigable. Only one decision focused solely (and unsuccessfully)
on whether the landowner’s property factually met EPA and
the Corps’ definition of wetlands.149 The remaining decisions determined whether wetlands were sufficiently connected to navigable waters or their tributaries to be waters
of the United States. Nine of them held that various tidal
wetlands were navigable.150 Three recited that the wetland
at issue was navigable because it was adjacent to navigable
water, but did not explain what they meant by “adjacent.”151
Others defined “adjacent” variously as bordering152; having
a hydrological connection153; being in close proximity154;
144. United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F. 2d 345, 10 ELR 20184 (10th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 4
ELR 20784 (6th Cir. 1974); Sun Enters., Inc. v. Train, 394 F. Supp. 211
(C.D.N.Y. 1975).
145. United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1185, 5 ELR 20308 (D.
Ariz. 1975).
146. United States v. St. Bernard Parish, 589 F. Supp. 617, 14 ELR 20794 (E.D.
La. 1984); Bayou Des Familles Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
541 F. Supp. 1025, 13 ELR 20055 (E.D. La. 1982).
147. United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 9 ELR 20757 (7th Cir. 1979).
148. United States v. Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 (10th Cir.
1979).
149. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 13 ELR 20942
(5th Cir. 1983).
150. Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 8 ELR 20480 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1984); United States
v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157, 14 ELR 20056 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Bayou
Des Familles Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 541 F. Supp. 1025,
13 ELR 20055 (E.D. La. 1982); United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp.
880, 12 ELR 20629 (D. Md. 1981); United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp.
1331, 10 ELR 20698 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Conservation Council of N.C. v.
Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653, 5 ELR 20666 (E.D.N.C. 1975); P.F.Z. Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 4 ELR 20710 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
151. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157; Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331; American
Dredging Corp. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
152. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204; Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 880.
153. United States v. Lee Wood Contractors, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 119, 12 ELR
20421 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
154. United States v. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. 366, 14 ELR 20588 (D. Md. 1984).
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being contiguous155; or neighboring.156 Some held that a
wetland was navigable because it was adjacent to navigable
water even though it was never flooded by that navigable
water157 or was separated from it by a 30-foot-wide berm158
or another tract of land.159 They held that navigable waters
could include an artificial wetland.160
The government was a party to the case in all but two
of these 29 decisions.161 The decisions used 10 interpretive
devices: precedent (26 decisions); broad interpretation to
serve statutory purposes (19 decisions); legislative history
(15 decisions); deference (4 decisions); reading harmoniously
with other statutes (4 decisions); plain meaning (3 decisions);
interpreting the statute to avoid absurd results (2 decisions);
structure of the statute (1 decision); give meaning to every
word (1 decision); the exception proves the rule (1 decision);
and equity (1 decision)—for an average of 2.7 interpretive
devices per decision. Of the 25 decisions citing precedent,162
12 cited United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co.163
and 10 cited United States v. Holland,164 the first court of
appeals and district court decisions, respectively, interpreting navigable water under the CWA. Many of the decisions
not directly citing legislative history did so indirectly by citing Ashland Oil or Holland, both of which included an analysis of the pertinent legislative history. The decisions cited an
average of 3.5 precedents.
None of these decisions suggested that courts were troubled by interpreting navigable water expansively to include
even waters that could not float a boat, despite Congress’
use of the term navigable waters as a jurisdictional phrase.
The lower courts considered and took at face value the legislative history indicating that Congress was exercising its
full constitutional authority to protect the nation’s waters
from pollution, and did not question the constitutionality
of that authority.

4.

Riverside Bayview and Subsequent Decisions

The Supreme Court’s first decision interpreting navigable
waters under the CWA was Riverside Bayview,165 in which
the Corps sought an injunction against defendants filling
wetlands, without a §404 permit, to support the subsequent construction of a housing development. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit narrowly interpreted
the Corps’ regulations, defining navigable water to include
only wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and periodically
155. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204; Lee Wood, 529 F. Supp. 119.
156. Lee Wood, 529 F. Supp. 119.
157. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204.
158. United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429, 13 ELR 20583 (11th Cir. 1983).
159. Lee Wood, 529 F. Supp. 119.
160. Track 12, Inc. v. District Eng’r, 618 F. Supp. 448, 16 ELR 20163 (D. Minn.
1985).
161. In some of these decisions, an official of the United States is a named party;
for example, in Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, John Marsh was
the Secretary of the Army.
162. See tbl. B.
163. 504 F.2d 1317, 4 ELR 20784 (6th Cir. 1974).
164. 373 F. Supp. 665, 4 ELR 20710 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
165. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 16 ELR
20086 (1985).
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inundated or flooded by those adjacent waters.166 Its purpose in interpreting the Corps’ regulations narrowly was to
avoid the question of whether §404 constituted an unconstitutional taking of the wetlands. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Byron White, the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court began its analysis by making clear
there was no constitutional issue justifying a narrow interpretation of the regulations.167 That decided, the Court had
no trouble finding that the Corps’ regulations covered the
wetlands at issue.168
The Court then addressed whether §404 authorized
the Corps to regulate filling wetlands “adjacent to but not
regularly flooded by rivers, streams, and other hydrographic
features more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters.’”169 The
Court specifically noted that it was not addressing the filling of nonadjacent wetlands,170 and then commenced a
quasi-Chevron171 analysis to determine whether the Corps’
interpretation of §404 was subject to deference. Skipping
step one of the Chevron analysis—determining whether the
statute is ambiguous—the Court moved directly to Chevron step two—determining whether the agency’s interpretation was a reasonable one. The Court began its analysis by
observing that although “[o]n a purely linguistic level, it may
appear unreasonable to classify ‘lands,’ wet or otherwise, as
‘waters,’” the interpretation is “reasonable because there is no
fine line dividing the waters of a navigable body of water and
the waters in an adjacent wetland, both are intermixed parts
of a continuum in the hydrological cycle.”172 The Court
concluded that a broad interpretation of navigable waters
was supported by the CWA’s broad definition of navigable
waters and the unanimous legislative history that the term
be interpreted as broadly as constitutionally possible.173
Finally, the Court concluded that Congress’ acquiescence in the Corps’ broad interpretation of navigable waters
during the 1977 amendments to the CWA supported the
reasonableness of the Corps’ interpretation. Although the
Court was mindful that subsequent legislative history or
legislative failure to act are not ordinarily helpful in interpreting earlier legislation, it concluded that the unsuccessful efforts in Congress to restrict the Corps’ jurisdiction
over wetlands in 1977 were pertinent because even the
proponents of restricting that jurisdiction would not have
divested the Corps of jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent
166. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 14 ELR
20365 (6th Cir. 1984).
167. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 127-28. Just because the Corps may deny
a §404 permit does not mean that it will do so. If the Corps does deny
a fill permit, there is no taking of the property unless it is deprived of all
economic value. Even if there is a taking, it is not unconstitutional unless no
just compensation is given.
168. Id. at 129-30.
169. Id. at 131.
170. Id. at 131, n.8.
171. Id. at 131. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984).
172. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132. The Court also deferred to the expertise
of the Corps and EPA in dealing with the hydrological cycle, noting that
the agencies were more capable than courts in determining whether there
are lines between particular navigable waters and their adjacent wetlands. Id.
at 134.
173. Id. at 133-34.
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to navigable waters, the very waters at issue in Riverside
Bayview. Thus, the Congress that amended §404 in 1977
specifically intended that §404 protect such wetlands, even
if the Congress that enacted §404 in 1972 had no articulated intent with regard to them.
The Court’s recognition that Congress “chose to define
the waters covered by the Act broadly,”174 and the Court’s
deference to the interpretations of navigable waters by the
Corps and EPA175 were taken by lower courts as signals to
continue construing navigable waters broadly in the context of tributaries and wetlands. Nineteen of the 23 (83%)
lower court decisions interpreting navigable waters in the
context of tributaries or wetlands after Riverside Bayview,
and prior to the next Supreme Court decision interpreting
navigable waters, held that the waters at issue were navigable.176 The decisions holding the waters at issue not to
be navigable did so primarily because the plaintiff did not
carry its factual burden of proof, rather than because the
courts narrowly interpreted the term navigable waters.177

a.

Tributaries

Nine of the decisions considered only whether tributaries
were navigable. Two of these held that creeks and bayous
flowing directly into ocean bays or sounds were navigable178
and one held that an unnamed tributary to interstate waters
was navigable.179 Two held that discharges to intermittently
flowing ditches eventually connecting with navigable water
were navigable,180 but one held that a dry arroyo was not
navigable, absent proof of a nexus to interstate commerce or
tributaries to interstate waters.181 Three held that discharges
to or subsequently flowing through ditches, canals, or other
man-made waterways were discharges to navigable waters.182
In holding that a creek was navigable, one court commented
that “virtually any surface water, navigable or not” is within
the jurisdiction of the CWA.183

b.

Wetlands

Three decisions upheld the government’s delineation of
wetlands,184 two of them deferring to the agency’s exper174. Id. at 133.
175. Id. at 131-34.
176. See tbl. B.
177. Id.
178. United States v. Gulf Park Water Co., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D. Miss.
1997) (bayou to Mississippi Sound); United States v. Zanger, 767 F. Supp.
1030, 22 ELR 20231 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (creek to San Francisco Bay).
179. Georgia v. City of East Ridge, Tenn., 949 F. Supp. 1571, 27 ELR 20782
(N.D. Ga. 1996) (sewer overflow to unnamed tributary to interstate creek).
180. Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285, 29 ELR 21387 (11th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 27 ELR 20853 (11th Cir. 1997).
181. Friends of Santa Fe Cnty. v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 26 ELR
20135 (D.N.M. 1995).
182. Driscoll, 181 F.3d 1285; Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336; United States v. TGR
Corp., 171 F.3d 108, 29 ELR 21059 (2d Cir. 1999) (channelized natural
brook, in places carried below ground in pipes).
183. Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 26 ELR
20639 (D. Mont. 1996).
184. Golden Gate Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 796 F.
Supp. 1306, 23 ELR 20267 (N.D. Cal. 1992); United States v. Malibu
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tise.185 Another court, however, held the wetlands at issue
were not within the Corps’ jurisdiction, because it had
failed to carry the burden of proof on delineation.186 The
remaining decisions considered mixed issues of whether
tributaries and wetlands were navigable. Most considered
whether wetlands were adjacent to navigable water. Three
held that wetlands were adjacent to a tidal lake, a tidal
pool, or other navigable water.187 One held that adjacent
meant “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” and that
a wetland was adjacent to navigable water, although onehalf mile away, because there was a groundwater connection and a surface water connection during hurricanes.188
Three held that isolated wetlands were not within the
Corps’ jurisdiction.189
The government was a party in all but four of the 22
decisions on tributaries and wetlands during this period.
The decisions used a total of eight interpretive devices:
precedent (applied in 19 decisions); broad interpretation
to serve legislative purpose (8 decisions); deference (5 decisions); structure of the statute (2 decisions); interpret statutory exemptions narrowly (2 decisions); statutory history
(1 decision); avoid constitutional issues (1 decision); plain
meaning (1 decision); and legislative history (1 decision).
The decisions used an average of 1.8 interpretive devices.
Of the 19 decisions citing precedent, nine used Riverside
Bayview190 and three used Ashland Oil.191
What differences are observable in lower court decisions before and after Riverside Bayview? While the
pre-Riverside Bayview set of decisions on tributaries and
wetlands used a total of 10 and an average of 2.8 interpretive devices, the set of decisions immediately after Riverside Bayview used a total of eight and an average of 1.8
devices to interpret navigable waters. While the earlier
set of decisions used an average of 3.4 precedents, the latter set used 1.8. While in the earlier set of decisions, 15
cited legislative history, only one cited it in the latter set
of decisions. This diminution in the depth of the courts’
analyses of the meaning of “navigable waters,” including
their almost complete disregard of legislative history, suggests that after Riverside Bayview the “navigable waters”
status of tributaries of navigable waters, even remote
Beach, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1301, 19 ELR 21247 (D.N.J. 1989); United
States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76, 17 ELR 20783 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
185. Golden Gate, 796 F. Supp. 1306; Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76.
186. In United States v. Hallmark Constr. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 28 ELR
21438 (N.D. Ill. 1998), the court characterized the wetland as isolated, but
appeared willing to consider the Corps’ argument that the pond was within
its jurisdiction because it was used by migratory birds. However, the Corps
did not carry its burden of proof that the pond actually was used by migratory birds.
187. Hanson v. United States, 710 F. Supp. 1105, 19 ELR 21074 (E.D. Tex.
1989) (tidal lake); Malibu Beach, 711 F. Supp. 1301 (tidal pool); Conant v.
United States, 786 F.2d 1008, 16 ELR 20453 (11th Cir. 1986) (unspecified
navigable water).
188. United States v. Banks, 873 F. Supp. 650, 25 ELR 20776 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
189. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 23 ELR 21139
(7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 28 ELR 20299 (4th
Cir. 1997); Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438,
22 ELR 21337 (1st Cir. 1992).
190. See tbl. B.
191. Id.
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tributaries, and of wetlands adjacent to tributaries had
become routine and required little analysis.

5.

SWANCC and Subsequent Decisions

The Supreme Court next interpreted the CWA’s “navigable
waters” term in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC).192 In that case,
local governments challenged the Corps’ denial of a §404
permit to fill a series of ponds remaining from a sand and
gravel mining operation, to construct a municipal landfill. The Corps had found the 31 acres of relatively shallow ponds to be navigable under its Migratory Bird Rule,
which extended its §404 jurisdiction to intrastate waters
used as habitat by birds protected by migratory bird treaties
to which the United States is a party or that migrated across
state lines.193 The five-to-four majority opinion, written by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, held that isolated waters
were not subject to the Corps’ jurisdiction. The majority
first emphasized that Riverside Bayview addressed wetlands adjacent to navigable water rather than ponds wholly
isolated from navigable water. It noted that the Riverside
Bayview opinion specifically disclaimed addressing waters
not adjacent to navigable waters.194 While noting that Riverside Bayview had commented “the word ‘navigable’ in
the statute was of ‘limited import,’” the SWANCC majority retorted that the definition of “navigable waters” as the
“waters of the United States,” does not “constitute a basis
for reading the term ‘navigable waters’ out of the statute.”195
The Court then denied Chevron deference to the Corps’
regulations and interpretation because the Corps’ interpretation had been inconsistent over time: first adopting the
traditional interpretation of navigable waters in 1974, then
adopting a more expansive interpretation the next year,196
and finally adopting the Migratory Bird Rule in 1986.197
The Court noted that deference is particularly inappropriate when an agency interpretation extends jurisdiction to
the farthest reaches of the Commerce Clause, and alters
the traditional federal/state balance that leaves regulation
of land use to state and local authorities.198 The Court also
192. 531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
193. 531 U.S. at 164.
194. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-68.
195. Id. at 172 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 133, 16 ELR 20086 (1985)). Justice Scalia commented similarly
in his dissent to Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon,
515 U.S. 687, 718-19, 25 ELR 21194 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting), that
“take” in the Endangered Species Act, could not be deprived of its traditional meaning with regard to wildlife by an expansive interpretation of
“harm” in the statutory definition of “take.”
196. The Court failed to note that, as discussed above, a court ordered the Corps
to expand its interpretation of navigable waters, or that EPA adopted a
much broader definition than the Corps from the outset.
197. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-74. This appears to be contrary to Riverside
Bayview, which had given deference to the Corps’ second interpretation,
although that interpretation was far more expansive than its first interpretation. At the time, the Corps’ 1986 migratory bird amendment to the
regulatory definition had yet to be promulgated and accordingly was not
considered in Riverside Bayview.
198. Query whether the CWA significantly interferes with state land use decisions? If states want to control CWA permitting decisions, they may administer the §402 program and much of the §404 program. The §402 program
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noted that the Commerce Clause did not grant unlimited
jurisdiction to Congress, citing United States v. Morrison199
and United States v. Lopez,200 both decided after Riverside
Bayview. It rejected the relevance of the same legislative
history of the CWA 1977 Amendments that was cited in
Riverside Bayview in support of that decision. While that
legislative history may not have been relevant to the Migratory Bird Rule, promulgated a decade later, the Court
rejected it on a far broader basis.201
The SWANCC dissent by Justice John Paul Stevens,
joined by three other Justices, reads as if they had used a different translation of Riverside Bayview than did the majority. The dissent even interpreted different sections of the
statute: Whereas the majority interpreted navigable waters
in §404, the dissent interpreted waters of the United States
in §502(7).202 The dissent did not characterize the wetland
at issue in the Court’s earlier Riverside Bayview decision as
adjacent to navigable waters, but instead characterized it as
“not itself navigable, directly adjacent to navigable water,
or even hydrologically connected to navigable water.”203
The dissent also laid out the argument that the Migratory
Bird Rule was well within Commerce Clause jurisdiction,
because of the aggregate effects of piecemeal elimination
of habitats essential to the multibillion-dollar recreational
commerce connected to bird-watching and fishing.204
SWANCC did not discuss tributaries or wetlands, but
merely held that isolated ponds were not navigable waters.
Nevertheless, the decision’s refusal to defer to the Corps’
interpretation of the statute205 and its observation that the
CWA’s broad definition of navigable waters did not read
“the term ‘navigable waters’ out of the statute”206 signaled
to lower courts that there are limits to which tributaries to
does not involve land use. The permit applicant can make whatever use of
the land it wants, as long as it treats resulting water pollution to federal and
state standards. The §404 permit program does not prohibit particular uses
of land, but it does prevent filling wetlands for any use without a permit. If,
as Justice Scalia claims, the Corps interprets §404 to include “ripples of sand
in the desert . . . engulf[ing] entire cities and immense arid wastelands,” see
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722, 36 ELR 20116 (2006), then
§404’s interference with state land use decisions could be real. However, as
this Article discusses, that description is overblown.
199. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
200. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In the course of invalidating a federal statute prohibiting possession of firearms near a school, the Court explained that the
Commerce Clause authorized only federal statutes regulating: (1) highways
of interstate or foreign commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce; or (3) activities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In
a 5/4 decision, it held that the effect on interstate commerce of educational
disruption caused by gun-related violence near schools was too tangential to
support Commerce Clause jurisdiction.
201. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 169-71. The Court generally disavowed the relevance
of failed amendments in interpreting a statute, especially failed amendments
in a later Congress. This was only part of a broader attack on the relevance
and reliability of legislative history, which has suffered a decline in use since
the enactment of the CWA. See Miller, Pollutant, supra note 7, at 967-68.
202. Compare the majority’s statement of the case, “We are asked to decide
whether the provision of §404(a) may be fairly extended to the isolated
ponds,” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 161, with the dissent’s: “[It] is the definition
[§502(7)] that is the appropriate focus of our attention,” SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175.
204. Id. at 192-97.
205. Id. at 168-69.
206. Id. at 172.
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navigable waters and their adjacent wetlands are navigable.
The Court stated: “The term ‘navigable’ has at least the
import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its
authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or
which could reasonably be so made.”207
In response to the Court’s first restrictive opinion on the
CWA’s navigable waters jurisdiction, 22 of 24 lower court
decisions (86%) held the waters at issue to be navigable,208
a slight increase over the 83% decided between Riverside
Bayview and SWANCC. Some lower courts interpreted
SWANCC as narrowly as they had interpreted navigable
waters broadly, reading SWANCC only to hold that isolated waters are outside the CWA’s jurisdiction.209 Other
courts, however, took SWANCC’s reading of Riverside
Bayview to limit the CWA’s jurisdiction to waters that are
navigable in fact or are adjacent to navigable-in-fact open
waters.210 Others wrestled with the meaning of adjacency,
noting that the Supreme Court did not define it in either
of its §404 decisions.211 One district court sought to reconcile the Court’s two rulings by holding that when “a drop
of rainwater landing in the [wetlands] is certain to intermingle with water from the [adjacent navigable river],” the
relationship is direct and therefore a “significant nexus.”212
SWANCC, however, provided more conservative courts
with the opportunity to fashion narrower interpretations
of “navigable waters.”

a.

Tributaries

Narrower interpretations of navigable waters by lower
courts were particularly pronounced with regard to tributaries. In three of these decisions, the courts held tributaries
not to be within navigable waters jurisdiction,213 based on
facts very similar to both earlier and contemporary decisions that had held tributaries to be navigable. In a fourth
decision, the court held the tributary at issue to be navigable, but rejected the government’s expansive interpretation
of navigable waters.214
207. Id. (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 40708 (1940)).
208. See tbl. B.
209. North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC, 278 F.
Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810,
32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir. 2001), agreed that an isolated vernal pool was not
navigable under SWANCC, but its other decisions cited in this segment of
the Article continue with an expansive interpretation of navigable waters.
210. In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003); Rice v. Harken Exploration
Co., 250 F.3d 264, 31 ELR 20599 (5th Cir. 2001); FD & P Enters., Inc.
v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2003); United
States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Va. 2002).
211. United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843, 31 ELR 20750 (D. Md.
2001).
212. United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877-78 (N.D. Ind.
2002), aff’d, 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003).
213. Rice, 250 F.3d 264; RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780; United States v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP, 195 F. Supp. 2d 751, 32 ELR 20573 (E.D. Va. 2002).
The significance of the two district court decisions, by the same judge, is
undercut by their invective against the Corps.
214. In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340.
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In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co.,215 one of the three
narrow decisions, the plaintiff brought suit under the citizen suit provision of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),216 which
prohibits the discharge of oil into navigable waters. He
alleged that the defendant discharged oil into intermittent
streams leading to navigable waters. But there was nothing
in the record, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded, “that could convince a reasonable trier of
fact that . . . any of the . . . intermittent creeks on the ranch
are sufficiently linked to an open body of navigable water
as to qualify for protection under the OPA.”217 While this
appears to be merely a case in which the plaintiff failed to
carry his burden of proof that the intermittent streams at
issue ever reached navigable water, the Fifth Circuit stated
with regard to tributaries that “a body of water is protected
under the Act only if it is actually navigable or is adjacent
to an open body of navigable water.”218 This is a narrow
interpretation of navigable waters with regard to wetlands,
but it is untenable with regard to tributaries, as discussed
below. Because the court searched the record for evidence
that the “intermittent creeks on the ranch are sufficiently
linked to an open body of navigable water as to qualify for
protection under the OPA,”219 its use of “adjacent to . . .
navigable water” may not have been an accurate description
of the Fifth Circuit’s perception of how tributaries must be
related to navigable waters to be within the jurisdiction of
the statute. Unfortunately, the court repeated this misleading adjacency concept in a later decision.
In re Needham220 was an appeal from the denial by a
bankruptcy court of the U.S. claim for its costs of remediating an oil spill. The government argued that navigable
waters included all tributaries “that have any hydrological connection with ‘navigable waters.’”221 In the Fifth
Circuit’s view, however, CWA jurisdiction did not extend
“over ‘tributaries’ that are neither themselves navigable nor
truly adjacent to navigable waters,” citing its Rice decision.222 The government “may not simply impose regulations over puddles, sewers, roadside ditches and the like;
under SWANCC ‘a body of water is subject to regulation
. . . if the body of water is actually navigable or adjacent to
an open body of navigable water,’”223 the court said. It continued: “[T]he proper inquiry is whether Bayou Folse, the
site of the farthest traverse of the spill, is navigable-in-fact
or adjacent to an open body of navigable water.”224 Because
“Bayou Folse flows directly into the Company Canal,”
which is navigable in fact, the court allowed the govern215. 250 F.3d 264, 31 ELR 20599 (5th Cir. 2001). This opinion does not interpret navigable waters under the CWA; instead, it interprets the same jurisdictional phrase in the Oil Pollution Act. That statute and §311 of the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. §1321, both address oil spills into the “navigable waters”
and are intimately intertwined.
216. 33 U.S.C. §§2701-2761, ELR Stat. OPA §§1001-7001.
217. Rice, 250 F.3d at 271.
218. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 271.
220. 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003).
221. Id. at 345.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 345-46.
224. Id. at 345.
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ment’s claim.225 Thus, the Fifth Circuit may be using
“adjacent” to mean “flowing into,” at least for tributaries.
Determining whether tributaries are navigable waters
by asking if they are adjacent to navigable-in-fact or open
water is misdirected for several reasons. First, the focus on
adjacency originates in the Corps’ §404 regulations, which
use adjacency only to claim jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, not over tributaries adjacent to
navigable waters.226 Second, the Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview held that only wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters were subject to §404’s jurisdiction, not that tributaries adjacent to navigable waters were subject to §402’s
jurisdiction.227 Third, “adjacent” means “having a common
border” or “abutting,”228 which may describe the relationship between wetlands and navigable waters, such as a
river, for wetlands are often next to rivers. Non-wetland
tributaries of rivers, such as creeks and streams, however,
cannot be adjacent to those rivers because those tributaries
do not flow next to, but rather into rivers.
Most lower courts continued to interpret the term
navigable waters with regard to tributaries and wetlands as if SWANCC had never happened. Courts interpreted navigable waters to include the following: primary
tributaries to navigable waters229; remote tributaries to
navigable waters230; intermittent flows231; man-made
or man-improved flows, including irrigation canals232;
ditches233; and waters channelled234 or pumped235 through
pipes and culverts under roads.

b.

Wetlands

Lower court wetlands decisions were largely confined to
decisions regarding tributaries. Decisions held that wetlands adjacent to both primary and remote tributaries were
navigable waters.236 One court held a wetland to be adjacent to navigable water despite being separated from it by a
225. Id. at 343.
226. 33 C.F.R. §328.3.
227. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126, 16
ELR 20086 (1985).
228. Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 11 (1967).
229. United States. v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2006); In re Needham,
354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003); Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp.
2d 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
230. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Adams Bros. Farming, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (C.D. Cal.
2003); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Idaho
2001); United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001).
231. California Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp.
2d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
232. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 31 ELR 20535
(9th Cir. 2001); Adams Bros., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1166; Idaho Rural Council,
143 F. Supp. 2d 1169.
233. Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP, 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003).
234. Treacy, 344 F.3d 407; Adams Bros., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1166; California Sportfishing, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1059.
235. United States v. Adams Bros. Farming, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (E.D.
Cal. 2002).
236. Treacy, 344 F.3d 407; Deaton, 332 F.3d 698; North Carolina Shellfish
Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C.
2003); United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001) (the
discharge was 240 miles from traditionally navigable waters).
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70-foot-wide berm.237 The government was a party in only
14 of the 22 cases interpreting navigable waters in the context of tributaries and wetlands. The increased proportion
of citizen suits did not affect their outcomes, however, as all
three decisions interpreting navigable waters narrowly were
in cases in which the government was a party.238 The decisions used 20 interpretive devices: precedent (applied in
22 decisions); broad interpretation (6 decisions); legislative
history (6 decisions); deference (6 decisions); plain meaning (5 decisions); finality (4 decisions); avoid constitutional
issues (4 decisions); structure of statute (3 decisions); lenity (1 decision); and read harmoniously with other statutes
(1 decision). The decisions used an average of 2.6 interpretive devices. All 22 decisions cited precedent; 20 cited
SWANCC and 10 cited Riverside Bayview.239 The decisions
cited an average of 5.2 precedents.
While the lower court decisions dating between Riverside Bayview and SWANCC used a total of 8 and an average
of 1.8 interpretive devices, the decisions between SWANCC
and Rapanos used a total of 10 and an average of 2.6 interpretive devices. While the earlier set of decisions cited an
average of 1.8 precedents, the lower court decisions issued
between Riverside Bayview and SWANCC cited an average
of 6.4. What conclusions can we draw from this quantitative analysis? Decisions on tributaries and wetlands after
SWANCC undertake their legal and factual analysis in
considerably more depth than do decisions issued between
Riverside Bayview and SWANCC. If SWANCC did not
prompt lower courts to find more frequently that waters
were non-navigable, it did remind them that expansive
interpretations of navigable waters were not to be made or
accepted without careful scrutiny.

6.

Rapanos and Subsequent Decisions

The 2006 Rapanos decision240 arose out of enforcement
actions for filling wetlands without §404 permits. The
wetlands at issue were adjacent to man-made drainage
ditches that flowed into a succession of other ditches and
creeks and ultimately into Lake Michigan. The plurality
opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by three other
Justices, held that the wetlands at issue were not within the
jurisdiction of the CWA. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Anthony Kennedy agreed with the plurality’s result, but
not with its reasoning. Chief Justice John Roberts joined
the plurality opinion, but filed a short concurrence lamenting that there was no majority opinion and acknowledging
the difficulty that would pose to lower courts. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent joined by three Justices. In addition to
joining Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, Justice Stephen
Breyer filed his own dissenting opinion.
As discussed above, the lack of a majority opinion in
Rapanos has required lower courts to spend more of their
237. Baccarat Freemont Devs., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 425 F.3d
1150 (9th Cir. 2005).
238. See tbls. A & B.
239. Id.
240. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
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energy interpreting Rapanos than interpreting the CWA.
Although the holding of Rapanos is opaque, it is clear that
the Court’s interpretation of navigable waters has become
increasingly restrictive since Riverside Bayview.
Two distinct but related questions are at issue in Rapanos. First, and most important, when is a tributary to a
traditionally navigable water within the CWA’s jurisdiction (that is, a jurisdictional tributary)? Second, when is
a wetland sufficiently connected to a traditionally navigable water or a jurisdictional tributary for the wetland to
be within the CWA’s jurisdiction (that is, a jurisdictional
wetland)? Although the plurality opinion addressed these
questions, its answers are incomplete. One reason is that
the plurality’s analyses conflated different elements of
§301(a). Another reason is that the plurality’s analyses are
sometimes obscured by vituperative outbursts against the
Corps, lower courts, and the dissenting and primary concurring opinions.
Justice Scalia began his plurality opinion with what
can only be described as a tirade designed to demonstrate
that the Corps “exercises the discretion of an enlightened
despot”241 by claiming §404 jurisdiction over “storm
drains, roadside ditches, ripples of sand in the desert that
may contain water once a year, and lands that are covered
by floodwaters once every 100 years . . . engulf[ing] entire
cities and immense arid wastelands.”242 Scalia complained
mightily that the Corps and the lower courts have continued to expand §404 jurisdiction “to include ‘ephemeral
streams’ and ‘drainage ditches’ as ‘tributaries’. . . [extending] to virtually any land feature over which rainwater or
drainage passes and leaves a visible mark—even if only the
241. Id. at 720.
242. Id. at 722. In particular, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion criticized Treacy
v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP, 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); Community Ass’n for the Restoration of
the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002); Headwaters,
Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 234 F.3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 27 ELR 20853 (11th Cir. 1997);
and Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 15 ELR 20530 (10th Cir.
1985). See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 725-27. Part of Justice Scalia’s ire is probably attributable to the fact that lower court decisions more frequently used
expansive interpretations of navigable waters after SWANCC than before it.
This could also reflect plaintiffs’ greater care in bringing and arguing cases
after SWANCC. See also the Fifth Circuit’s diatribe in In re Needham, 354
F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2003), against the Corps for claiming jurisdiction
over “puddles, sewers, roadside ditches and the like.”
		 Many of Justice Scalia’s outlandish examples of Corps overreach are
hyperbole. The Corps does not and never has claimed jurisdiction over
mud puddles or ripples of sand in the desert. For one thing, sand ripples
in deserts and dunes are created by wind; when precipitation falls on them,
it generally percolates down through the sand rather than flowing down
the outsides of dunes. But when tempered, Justice Scalia’s concerns are
understandable. Most land is covered at times with water, however thinly,
although Congress did not claim jurisdiction for the CWA over most land:
Most land is neither navigable water nor water of the United States. Justice
Scalia’s inconsistent focus on the permanence of waterways elsewhere in the
opinion may be seeking a distinction between stormwater runoff and water
bodies. That is analogous to the distinction Congress established between
point sources and nonpoint sources. Unfortunately, neither distinction is a
bright line, any more than the edge between a river and an adjacent wetland
is a bright line. Sheetwater runoff is stormwater and few would claim that it
is a tributary of navigable water, although much of it may flow to navigable
water. On the other hand, many would claim that a desert gully, roaring
with a flash flood after rains, is a tributary of the navigable river into which
its flash floods flow.
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presence of litter and debris,” despite the Court’s narrowing of §404 jurisdiction in SWANCC.243
Justice Scalia acknowledged that Congress intended
CWA jurisdiction to extend beyond traditional navigable
waters, as the Court had recognized in both Riverside Bayview and SWANCC. On the other hand, he noted that in
SWANCC, the Court took pains to emphasize “that the
qualifier ‘navigable’ is not devoid of significance”244 and
that CWA jurisdiction is limited to ‘waters,’ whether qualified by ‘navigable’ or ‘of the United States.”245 He then
launched into a counterintuitive demonstration that the
definitions of “water” and “waters” in the 1954 edition of
Webster’s New International Dictionary lead to the conclusion that “the waters of the United States” is a subset of
“water of the United States.”246 (Query: How can the plural
“waters” be a subset of the singular “water”?)
In short, Scalia argues, the CWA’s incorporation of the
term navigable waters confers jurisdiction “only over relatively permanent bodies of water” and “does not authorize
[a] ‘Land Is Water’ approach to federal jurisdiction.”247
(Query: Assuming that the term “the waters of the United
States” is a subset of “water of the United States,” how does
that suggest that “navigable waters” include only permanent bodies of water? That is a non sequitur.) Justice Scalia posits that the statute’s definition of another element of
the water pollution offense confirms this, because ditches,
channels, and conduits, which typically convey transitory
waters, are defined as “point sources” and therefore discharge into “navigable waters” rather than carry “navigable
waters.”248 (Again, this is a non sequitur. Granted that
point sources convey polluted water to navigable waters,
how does that establish that the conveyed waters are not
themselves navigable?) Scalia supports his analysis with
the need to narrowly interpret statutes when their jurisdictions extend to the outer edges of Congress’ constitutional
authority or intrude on states’ traditional authority over
land use without an explicit statement by Congress of its
intent to do so.249
Justice Scalia then summarizes the plurality’s conclusions. Jurisdictional waters (presumably including tributaries)
include[ ] only those relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing bodies of water “forming geographic features” that are described in ordinary parlance
as “streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers [and] lakes.” [The juris243. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724-29.
244. Id. at 731 (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 172, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
245. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731-36.
246. Id. at 732-33 (emphasis added).
247. Id. at 734.
248. Id. at 735-36. Ditches, channels, and conduits convey water that is transitory in the sense that the water they convey is in transit. But is the water
transitory in a temporal sense, as Justice Scalia seems to be using the term?
Roadside ditches normally flow during and after storm events, but in places,
they continually convey streamwater that has been rerouted, for instance, to
pass under roads in culverts. The English Channel is always wet, as is the
main channel of the Mississippi River, and both are navigable. Moreover,
Justice Scalia’s argument is a non sequitur, as pointed out in the text.
249. Id. at 738.
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diction] does not include channels, through which water
flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall.250

He asserts that this narrower definition of navigable
waters will not jeopardize the reach of the §402 program,
because the discharge of pollutants into an intermittent stream from which they will wash downstream into
navigable waters would still be covered: The statute does
not require that the discharge be directly into navigable
water.251 Jurisdictional wetlands are “only those wetlands
with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are
‘waters of the United States’ in their own right, so that there
is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands.”252
The plurality opinion does not directly address the question of whether tributaries of navigable waters are waters
of the United States, but tributaries are easily susceptible
to the analysis that the plurality poses for jurisdictional
waters. Moreover, the plurality commented that “the discharge into intermittent channels of any pollutant that
naturally washes downstream likely violates §1311(a), even if
the pollutants discharged from a point source to not emit
‘directly into’ covered waters.”253 Pollutants discharged to
tributaries of navigable water naturally wash downstream
into those navigable waters.
It is difficult to discern the Rapanos plurality’s precise
conclusion with regard to jurisdictional tributaries, in part
because its analysis is abstract and largely divorced from
the facts of the cases before it and in part because it does
not sharply separate its analysis of whether a tributary is
jurisdictional from its analysis of whether a wetland is
jurisdictional. Finally, the plurality opinion is inconsistent on what constitutes a navigable tributary. It begins
by stating that navigability connotes “continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry
channels through which water occasionally or intermittently flows . . . [and does not] encompass[ ] transitory
puddles or ephemeral flows of water.”254 The opinion does
not define what it means by “ephemeral flows.” The plurality continues:
[A]pplying the definition [of “navigable waters”] to
“ephemeral streams,” “wet meadows,” storm sewers and
culverts, “directional sheet flow during storm events,”
drain tiles, man-made drainage ditches, and dry arroyos
in the middle of the desert, the Corps has stretched the
term “waters of the United States” beyond parody. The
plain language of the statute simply does not authorize
this “Land is Waters” approach to federal jurisdiction.255

While some of these examples are admittedly farfetched to deem as tributaries to navigable waters, others
250. Id. at 739.
251. Id. at 742-45. See also Amil Anthony, Shotguns, Spray, and Smoke: Regulating
Atmospheric Deposition of Pollution Under the Clean Water Act, 29 UCLA J.
Envtl. L. & Pol’y 215, 235-37 (2011).
252. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.
253. Id. at 743.
254. Id. at 733.
255. Id. at 734.

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

45 ELR 10568

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

are not. Storm sewers, culverts, and drainage ditches, for
example, often replace or channel existing natural streams
that otherwise might be easily categorized as tributaries.
The opinion dwells on the necessity of “at bare minimum,
the ordinary presence of water.”256 While the plurality
acknowledges that ditches, channels, and conduits can
carry constant flows, it asserts that when they do, they are
called rivers, creeks, streams, or moats, implying they may
be navigable waters under those circumstances.257 (Query:
What about the English Channel, which carries a constant
flow; should we call it the English River or English moat?)
Finally, the opinion states that “waters of the United
States” “does not include channels through which water
flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall.”258 The plurality only
examined two aspects of whether a tributary is navigable:
whether it forms a “geographic feature”; and whether its
flow is permanent. But in a footnote, the plurality admitted that it did not “necessarily exclude seasonal rivers, which
contain continuous flow during some months of the year
but no flow during dry months.”259 Indeed, the opinion
did not distinguish between the intermittency of flow that
would include or exclude a water body from being “waters
of the United States,” beyond “[c]ommon sense and common usage.”260
The Rapanos plurality did not address what constitutes a
wetland, but limited itself to addressing what types of wetlands are jurisdictional wetlands. A jurisdictional wetland
must be adjacent to a navigable water or a jurisdictional
tributary of a navigable water. Wetlands adjacent to such
a water are “only those wetlands with a continuous surface
connection to . . . ‘waters of the United States’ in their own
right, so that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’
and wetlands.”261 The plurality’s test applies to whether a
wetland is a jurisdictional wetland, not to whether a tributary is a jurisdictional tributary. At the same time, the
plurality’s concern with whether a water is permanent, seasonal, or ephemeral was in the context of whether tributaries were jurisdictional tributaries, not to whether a wetland
is permanent, seasonal, or ephemeral, although it is not
much of an additional step to consider the issue in that
context, given the plurality’s concern that water not be
classified as dry land.
The analysis in the concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy focused almost entirely on wetlands. His reading
of Riverside Bayview and SWANCC is that the Corps’
“jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence
of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question
and navigable waters in the traditional sense.”262 Wetlands
have a significant nexus with navigable waters “if the wet256. Id.
257. Id. at 736 n.7. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion seeks to dismiss this issue by
commenting that when ditches do flow constantly, they are called streams,
a dubious proposition for which he offers no authority.
258. Id. at 739.
259. Id. at 733 n.5.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 742.
262. Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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lands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters
more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”263 Adjacency of a
wetland to navigable-in-fact waters is sufficient to establish a significant nexus, and adjacency to major tributaries may be sufficient. But adjacency to other tributaries
requires the Corps to “establish a significant nexus on a
case-by-case basis.”264
Justice Kennedy would have remanded the cases for a
determination of whether the wetlands in question had a
significant nexus to navigable-in-fact waters. His opinion
does not indicate when a tributary is sufficiently “major”
for adjacency to satisfy his “significant nexus” test. He
rejected the plurality’s conclusions that tributaries must
be permanently flowing and have a continuous surface
connection to be waters of the United States,265 pointing
out that the requirement of permanent flow “makes little
practical sense in a statute concerned with downstream
water quality.”266
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens and three
other Justices accorded Chevron deference to the Corps’
regulations defining navigable waters to include wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters and their tributaries. Like Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, the dissenting opinion
provides a point-by-point refutation of the plurality opinion. Not surprisingly, the focus of the plurality is on the
meaning of navigable waters, while the focus of both Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the dissent is on the meaning of waters of the United States.267
Thus, in regard to tributaries, the plurality in Rapanos
developed a test under which most tributaries of navigable
waters, even remote tributaries, would be navigable waters,
but inconsistently drew a line at intermittent tributaries.
With regard to intermittent tributaries, it suggested that
the discharge of pollutants into intermittent waters from
which the pollutants naturally wash downstream into
navigable waters are indirect discharges to navigable water,
violating §301(a). The concurrence did not focus on tributaries. The dissent concluded that tributaries of navigable
water, major or remote, are navigable water, and argued
that even intermittent tributaries could be navigable waters.
None of the Justices argued that tributaries to navigable
waters were not themselves waters of the United States. As
to intermittent tributaries, the plurality’s guidance is negative, but also ambiguous and in the minority.
Post-Rapanos lower court decisions perceive Rapanos as
game-changing for the interpretation of the terms navigable waters and waters of the United States, and focus their
interpretations of those terms on Rapanos. Of the 34 lower
court decisions issued after Rapanos, 25 of those decisions
263. Id. at 780.
264. Id. at 782.
265. Id. at 769-71.
266. Id., at 769.
267. Compare Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723 (plurality), with Rapanos, 547 U.S. at
759 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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(74%) held the waters at issue to be navigable, a decrease
from the findings in 86% of the decisions dating between
SWANCC and Rapanos. Unfortunately, a large part of the
lower courts’ attention to Rapanos is devoted to determining what its holding means in the absence of a majority
opinion. Chief Justice Robert’s short concurring opinion
lamented that without a majority opinion, the “[l]ower
courts and regulated entities will now have to feel their way
on a case-by-case basis,” citing Marks v. United States.268
Marks directed lower courts that “[w]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding . . . may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”269
Lower courts struggled mightily to determine whether
to use the plurality test, the concurrence test, or both. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has followed the concurrence’s significant nexus test.270 The U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits
have applied alternately either the plurality or the concurrence tests.271 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits apparently
require plaintiffs to prove both tests.272 And the Seventh
Circuit and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
have preferentially employed the concurrence test, but if
that is not met will look to the plurality test.273
These courts misperceive the Kennedy concurrence’s
significant nexus test, however, when they apply it to determine whether a tributary is a water of the United States.
Justice Kennedy developed and used that test only to determine whether a wetland is a water of the United States. As
to tributaries, his concurrence only commented that the
plurality’s insistence that tributaries must be permanent to
be waters of the United States was ill-founded. On that
issue, he joined the four dissenting Justices. A few courts
have recognized the inapplicability of the significant nexus
test to tributaries.274 Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus
test requires a jurisdictional wetland to affect significantly
the water quality of a wetland and presumes such an effect
if the wetland is adjacent to traditionally navigable water or
a major tributary thereof. Because tributaries flow directly
into navigable-in-fact waters, tributaries inevitably affect
the water quality of navigable waters; in the aggregate,
even remote tributaries do so, echoing Justice Kennedy’s
conclusion that it “makes little practical sense in a statute
concerned with downstream water quality”275 to require a
268. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
269. Id. at 193.
270. United States v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208, 1219-21 (11th Cir. 2011).
271. United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 76, 42 ELR 20328 (3d Cir. 2011); United States
v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006).
272. United States v. Cundiff, 535 F.3d 200, 210, 39 ELR 20025 (6th Cir.
2009); United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 24 (5th Cir. 2008).
273. Northern Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th
Cir. 2006).
274. United States v. Vierstra, 2011 WL 1064526, *5 (D. Idaho); Benjamin v.
Douglas Ridge Rifle Club, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1215 (D. Or. 2009).
275. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 769, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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nexus showing for tributaries.276 In this light, EPA’s scientific study277 demonstrating that 60% of the flow of rivers
and streams in the northeast originate in headwaters, confining the presumption of a nexus to primary tributaries,
does not make sense.
The government was a party in 20 of the 34 lower court
tributary and wetland decisions after Rapanos.278 All 34
decisions used precedent and all cited Rapanos, the first
time that all precedent-citing decisions cited the same decision. Fourteen of the decisions cited Riverside Baywiew and
12 of them cited SWANCC. The decisions cited an average of 5.9 precedents. The number of precedents cited by
the post-Rapanos decisions was comparable to the number
of decisions cited by lower court decisions issued between
SWANCC and Rapanos, but the importance of precedent
as an interpretive device was far greater in the post-Rapanos
decisions. Although 34 post-Rapanos lower-court decisions
cited precedent, only 11 used deference,279 10 employed a
broad interpretation to achieve the statute’s objective,280 6
each used the structure of the statute,281 5 used its plain
meaning,282 3 used reading harmoniously with another
statute,283 2 interpreted exceptions narrowly,284 and 1used
avoiding constitutional issues.285 While this set of decisions
used precedent as an interpretive device 34 times, they used
all other interpretive devices in the aggregate only 38 times,
compared to the decisions issued between SWANCC and
Rapanos, which used precedent as an interpretive device 22
times and all the other interpretive devices in the aggregate 36 times.286 Similarly, 19 of the post-Rapanos decisions
used precedent as their sole interpretive device, while only
four of the earlier decisions did so.287
Why did precedent become preeminent as an interpretive device after Rapanos? In part, it is because there were
by then four Supreme Court decisions interpreting navigable waters under the CWA (three of them under §404),
twice as many as interpreted any of the other elements of
the water pollution offense. Unfortunately, it is also in
part because the principal focus of the lower courts is how
Rapanos applies to the facts of their cases, a question whose
276. While Justice Kennedy made that comment with regard to the plurality’s
test of permanence and continuing surface connection, the comment applies as well in this context.
277. See U.S. EPA, Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence
(2013). The draft version of this study is summarized in Appendix A to
the preamble of EPA’s proposed rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 22188, 22222-52 (Apr.
21, 2014). The document may be found at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/fedrgstr_activities/Watershed%20Connectivity%20Report?.
The study was conducted by EPA’s Office of Research and Development.
It underwent peer review under the supervision of EPA’s Science Advisory
Board (SAB). SAB review was completed in October 2014, and EPA released the final study in January 2015. 80 Fed. Reg. 2100 (Jan. 15, 2015).
278. See tbl. B.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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answer is far from clear due to the lack of a majority decision and the opaqueness of the plurality opinion.
In the wake of SWANCC and Rapanos, EPA and the
Corps jointly issued a guidance document on their regulatory definitions of waters of the United States,288 and more
recently have published proposed amendments to them.
This Article focuses on the proposed amendments as the
latest indication of the agencies’ thinking. For the most
part, they deal with tributaries and wetlands and continue
to claim as much jurisdiction as possible in light of the
decisions. The proposed amendments continue to claim
jurisdiction over traditionally navigable waters, interstate
waters, the territorial seas, and their tributaries. For the
first time, however, the proposed amendments define
“tributary”. A tributary is “a water physically characterized by the presence of a bed and banks and ordinary high
water mark . . . which contributes flow, either directly or
through another water, to a water” that is traditionally
navigable, interstate, a territorial sea, or an impoundment
of such water.289
The proposed amendments add that “wetlands, lakes,
and ponds are tributaries (even if they lack a bed and banks
or ordinary high water mark) if they contribute flow, either
directly or through another water to a traditionally navigable water, interstate water, or territorial sea.”290 They add that
a tributary does not lose its jurisdictional status if its flow is
interrupted by human causes, such as culverts or dams, or
natural causes, such as debris piles or underground flow.291
Finally, they provide that jurisdictional tributaries include
“rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, impoundments, canals and
ditches” not otherwise excluded in the proposed regulation.292 The exclusions include several categories of ditches
and all groundwater.293 The guidance document and the
preamble to the proposed regulation include both legal and
scientific justifications for these provisions, although the
preamble’s are far more extensive.
How does the EPA/Corps joint proposal square with the
Supreme Court’s two recent decisions? In some respects, it
follows the decisions. For instance, the Court in SWANCC
held that the CWA did not extend to waters solely because
they are habitats for migratory birds. In response, the proposed amendments drop the present claim over other waters
“the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect
or could affect interstate or foreign commerce including . . .
waters which are or could be used by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes . . . .” Although
there are strong arguments that Congress has the authority
to cover such waters, under either the Commerce Clause or
288. U.S. EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction
Following the U. S. Supreme Court Decision in Rapanos v. United States
& Carabell v. United States (June 2007 Legal Memorandum), available at
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/documents-related-proposed-definition-waters-united-states-under-clean-water-act.
289. 79 Fed. Reg. 22188, 22268 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014), to be codified at 40
C.F.R. §122.2(c)(5).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id., to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.1(b)(4) & (5).
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the Treaty Powers Clause, the Court concluded that Congress did not exercise such powers in the CWA. That leaves
it open for Congress to explicitly exercise such powers over
these waters, an action that Congress is unlikely to take in
the present political climate. For these waters, EPA’s proposed definition substitutes jurisdiction over other waters
that the Agency determines on a case-by-case basis have
a significant nexus to traditionally navigable waters and
jurisdictional tributaries, following Justice Kennedy’s suggestion. That results in an exercise of Agency jurisdiction
over a narrower set of waters.
The plurality in Rapanos repeatedly demanded that
jurisdictional waters have continuous surface connections to traditionally navigable waters. In response, the
EPA/Corps proposed amendments specifically exclude
groundwater, although tributaries will not lose their
jurisdictional status merely because they flow underground for parts of their courses due to natural or
human-induced conditions. The Court did not consider
such situations, but they are reasonably in keeping with
the nature of tributaries. The proposed amendments also
dropped EPA’s earlier claim over intermittent streams
and playa lakes affecting interstate commerce, but they
did not exclude intermittent streams meeting the definition of tributaries. Moreover, the proposed amendments
claim jurisdiction over “waters located within the . . .
floodplain” of a traditionally navigable water, interstate
water, the territorial seas, or a tributary or impoundment
of the same.294
Query whether EPA claims jurisdiction over mud puddles on floodplains or standing water after rains in farmers’
fields on floodplains? If so, the Rapanos plurality will surely
demur. The proposed definition’s inclusion of ditches,
unless specifically excluded, also runs afoul of the Rapanos
plurality’s observation that ditches are point sources and
therefore cannot be navigable waters. The plurality further
observed that ditch flows are intermittent and are called
streams if their flows are permanent. The Court did not
deal with the fact that many ditches are rerouted streams,
no less tributaries than in their original natural beds. All
of this suggests further litigation on the status of ditches.
Many ditches fall within the proposed definition or the
plain meaning of tributaries, especially those that are
rerouted streams or creeks.
The proposed amendments to EPA and the Corps’ definitions of waters of the United States continue to claim
jurisdiction over “all waters, including wetlands adjacent
to” traditionally navigable waters, interstate waters, the
territorial seas, and impoundments of and tributaries to
such waters.295 This changes the tone of the definition from
focusing on wetlands to focusing on all adjacent waters,
including wetlands. The proposal uses both the plurality’s
direct connection test and Justice Kennedy’s significant
nexus tests for adjacency. The proposed definition is closer
294. Id., to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.2(a)(6), (c)(1), (2) & (4).
295. Id., to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.2(a)(6).
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to Justice Kennedy’s test than it is to the plurality’s test.296
The plurality test for adjacency is whether the surface
waters from the wetland and the adjacent navigable water
or tributary intermingle to the extent that they cannot be
separated. The proposed definition of adjacent is “bordering, contiguous or neighboring,” picking up on many lower
court definitions of the term. It provides that separation by
natural or human-made dikes, berms, “and the like” does
not affect adjacency, again drawing on many lower court
definitions of adjacency. The proposed definition even provides that waters in floodplains of jurisdictional waters with
“a shallow subsurface hydrologic connection” to the jurisdictional waters are neighboring and therefore adjacent to
those jurisdictional waters.297 This goes beyond the Rapanos plurality’s expressed concept of adjacency. Moreover, it
seemingly conflicts with the agencies’ expressed exclusion
of groundwater from the definition. These differences will
undoubtedly be resolved by further litigation.
The agencies’ special regard for wetlands is expressed in
their proposed amendments to the definition of waters of
the United States. For the first time, the agencies assert
that wetlands themselves often are tributaries.298 They
are in essence piggybacking §404 jurisdiction on §402
jurisdiction because both the plurality and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions appreciate that pollution flows
downstream; thus, to be effective, §402 jurisdiction must
include all tributaries, at least all relatively permanent ones.
Although this is a clever move by the agencies to bolster
their §404 jurisdiction, it may have the unfortunate effect
of undercutting their §402 jurisdiction by narrowing judicial interpretations of tributary.299

B.

Isolated Waters

Neither the CWA nor its legislative history state explicitly
whether the statute’s jurisdiction includes discharges to
isolated water bodies. EPA and Corps regulations do not
explicitly claim jurisdiction over isolated waters, but EPA’s
current regulations include the following: natural ponds,
which could be isolated; playa lakes, which are usually
isolated; and “other waters” which “could affect interstate
commerce.”300 Both regulatory definitions include intrastate waters that are used by interstate travelers for recreation, which could describe many isolated waters. Isolated
waters could also affect interstate commerce under the second or third prong of Lopez. The CWA’s use of the jurisdictional term navigable waters, however, suggests to the
courts that Congress relied on the first prong of Lopez, in
which jurisdiction rarely extends to isolated waters because
296. Id., to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.2(c)(6).
297. Id., to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.2(c)(1), (2).
298. Id., to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.2(c)(5). In the definition of “Tributary”
the proposed regulations provide that “wetlands . . . are tributaries . . . if they
contribute flow” to a navigable water.
299. After all, as discussed above, all of the Court’s narrow interpretations of navigable waters have been §404 decisions and two have been wetlands cases.
300. 33 C.F.R. §323.2(a)(5); 40 C.F.R. §122.2. Playa lakes are usually dry and
without outlets.
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few are highways or parts of highways of interstate or foreign commerce.301
The isolation of a water body alone, however, does not
always defeat its status as navigable water under the first
prong of Lopez. For instance, the Court held in Utah v.
United States that the Great Salt Lake is navigable, despite
its isolation from other waters, because it had been used
as a highway or part of a highway of interstate commerce,
squarely within the first prong of Lopez.302 The Seventh
Circuit held in United States v. Byrd303 that a 2,000-to
3,000-acre isolated lake in Indiana was subject to CWA
navigable water jurisdiction because interstate travelers
used it for recreational boating, also placing it within the
first prong of Lopez, but not as clearly so because the use
was recreational rather than commercial.304
Such claims cannot be made for most isolated waters,
however, especially small isolated water bodies. Isolated
waters, even smaller ones, might be within the second or
third Lopez prongs of Commerce Clause jurisdiction, but
the Court has not recognized that Congress intended to
use such jurisdiction for the CWA. An example of such a
claim is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,305 holding that an intrastate stream, located totally within one
county and unconnected with other waters, was navigable
based on the use of its waters for agricultural irrigation
from which products were sold in interstate commerce.
Isolated water bodies might have an aggregate effect on
recreational or other interstate commerce, exemplified by
fishing from boats.
The Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC on the issue
of isolated water bodies is not unique, but it is determinative. The facts of the case involved a site proposed for
a landfill that included an aggregate of 31 acres of shallow ponds remaining from a sand and gravel operation,
with no connections to other waters. The Corps did not
claim jurisdiction over them as natural ponds, presumably
because they were created by the former mining operations.
The Corps’ only jurisdictional claim was its Migratory Bird
Rule, which the Court held was beyond the authority Congress delegated to the Corps in §404. The Court implicitly
interpreted the CWA to limit Congress’ claim to Commerce Clause jurisdiction to be within the first prong of
the Lopez test,306 while the dissent would have extended the
claim to the second and third prongs of the Lopez test and
would have found that claim to be constitutional.307
Several lower courts have held that the CWA’s jurisdiction does not extend to isolated waters. After Rapanos, the
301. For an argument to the contrary, see Jon Devine et al., The Intended Scope of
Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 41 ELR 11118, 11124 (Dec. 2011).
302. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 1 ELR 20250 (1971).
303. 609 F.2d 1204, 9 ELR 20757 (7th Cir. 1979).
304. Query: How compelling a distinction is this, when recreational boating is a
multibillion-dollar business and some recreational boaters rent their vessels
from commercial mariners?
305. 599 F.2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 (10th Cir. 1979).
306. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 171-74, 31 ELR 20382 (2001).
307. Id. at 192-96.
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Ninth Circuit held in San Francisco Baykeeper v.Cargill
Salt Division308 that a 17-acre artificial pond was not navigable although it was adjacent to admittedly navigable
water, because the adjacency test applied only to wetlands, not to ponds. In Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers,309 the Corps, after SWANCC,
withdrew the portion of its action that had claimed filling a vernal pond violated §404, and the Ninth Circuit
reversed the lower court’s ruling that the vernal pond was
navigable water.
Before SWANCC, the Seventh Circuit in Village of
Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp.310 held that
a six-acre retention pond built to collect stormwater
runoff from a shopping mall parking lot, with no connection to other surface water, was not navigable water.
The court noted that EPA’s definition of navigable water
included natural ponds and thereby by implication
excluded artificial ponds such as the pond at issue. The
tenor of the opinion, however, suggests that the court
would have reached the same conclusion even if the pond
had been natural. In Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, EPA,311 the Seventh Circuit held there was no
CWA jurisdiction over an isolated wetland. Although
the opinion, issued prior to SWANCC, appeared willing to accept a jurisdictional claim under the Corps’
Migratory Bird Rule, the government made no showing
that the wetland was actually used by migratory birds
or had other effects on interstate commerce. In United
States v. Hallmark Construction Co.,312 a district court
held that an isolated five-acre wetland was beyond the
Corps’ jurisdiction in the absence of proof of a connection with interstate commerce.313
EPA’s proposed amendments to its definition of waters
of the United States do not explicitly include or exclude
isolated waters. But they no longer include the existing
claim to jurisdiction over
other waters such as intrastate . . . lakes, prairie potholes,
wet meadows, playa lakes or natural ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or could
affect interstate or foreign commerce; . . . [including use]
by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other
purposes; . . . [use for taking] fish or shellfish . . . [for sale]
in interstate or foreign commerce; . . . [or use] for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce.314

Thus, EPA is abandoning the argument that in enacting the CWA, Congress exercised its Commerce Clause
jurisdiction under the second or third prongs of Lopez, the
jurisdictional claim most likely to support regulating some
isolated waters. Although the proposal notes that ponds
308. 481 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2007).
309. 261 F.3d 810, 816, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir. 2001).
310. 24 F.3d 962, 24 ELR 21080 (7th Cir. 1994).
311. 999 F.2d 256, 23 ELR 21139 (7th Cir 1993).
312. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 28 ELR 21438 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
313. See also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 28 ELR 20299 (4th Cir.
1997), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
an isolated wetland was not navigable water.
314. 40 C.F.R. §122.21, Waters of the United States (c).
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can be tributaries,315 isolated ponds would not benefit from
the definition of tributaries.
On the other hand, the proposal includes “other waters,”
which EPA determines on a case-by-case basis “alone or in
combination with other similarly situated waters” have a
significant nexus to other waters within the definition of
waters of the United States. EPA’s scientific justification for
the proposal includes studies suggesting that many “unidirectional wetlands,” such as prairie potholes, vernal pools,
and playa lakes with subsurface connections to waters of the
United States, may be shown to have a significant nexus to
waters of the United States.316 Indeed, EPA leaves open and
seeks comments on the option to determine by rule that
prairie potholes and other specified categories of waters do
have a significant nexus to “waters of the United States.”317
Because such examples lack surface connections to navigable waters, the Rapanos plurality is unlikely to agree with
the Agency’s reasoning. However, Justice Kennedy and the
Rapanos minority (who together form a majority of the Justices) may well agree with it.
The decisions discussed above in this section deal with
both natural and artificial bodies of water. They suggest
that, even absent SWANCC, courts have not been receptive
to holding isolated waters to be within the CWA’s jurisdiction, unless they are used as parts of a traditional highway
of commerce. In any event, SWANCC now requires that
result. In the unusual case where isolated waters have been
used, may currently be used, or with reasonable improvements could be used in the future as parts of highways of
interstate commerce, those isolated waters are arguably
navigable. But showing that uses of isolated water bodies have an aggregate impact on interstate commerce will
not make them navigable because the Court has in effect
ruled that Congress did not intend to exercise the second
or third Lopez prongs of its Commerce Clause jurisdiction
in the CWA. Moreover, EPA has impliedly acceded to this
conclusion in its proposed amendments to its regulatory
definition of waters of the United States.
Congress could claim expanded jurisdiction by eliminating the use of navigable waters as a jurisdictional term
in the CWA, perhaps substituting waters of the United
States, and making findings that water pollution control of isolated waters, or at least some classes of isolated
waters, meet the second or third prong of the Lopez test.
Congress could also claim expanded jurisdiction under
the Constitution’s federal treaty powers and the implementing Migratory Bird Treaty Act to protect migratory
birds, including protection of their habitats.318 In the
meantime, the question of whether transporting boats
or fishermen across state lines to fish, hunt, or engage
in other recreational activities on isolated waters makes
those waters part of the highways of interstate commerce
315. 79 Fed. Reg. 22268, to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §122.2(c)(6).
316. Id. at 22225-26.
317. Id. at 22250-52.
318. U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. [2]; Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§703-711. See Scott Finet, Habitat Protection and the Migratory Bird Protection Act, 10 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 1 (2003).
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subject to Commerce Clause jurisdiction remains undecided.319 Although the Court interprets the CWA not to
claim such jurisdiction, the Court has not addressed, and
has not needed to address, whether Congress has authority to claim it.

C.

Groundwater

Neither the CWA’s general prohibition against the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters in §301(a) nor the
definition of navigable waters in §502(7) mention groundwater. The statute, however, is replete with references to
groundwater.320 These frequent references indicate that
Congress was aware of groundwater and groundwater
pollution when it drafted the statute, suggesting that its
failure to mention groundwater in §301(a) or the definition of navigable waters was an intentional choice not to
regulate discharges of pollutants to groundwater. Moreover, the statute’s frequent coupling of “navigable waters
and ground waters” indicates that Congress viewed them
as distinct rather than overlapping categories of water.321
Finally, repeated legislative history explicitly stated that the
CWA did not regulate discharges of pollutants to groundwater, and Congress rejected amendments that would have
included regulation of discharges of pollutants to ground319. One commenter lays out the argument that such recreational use of isolated
waters will not render them navigable under any prong of Lopez. See Funk,
supra note 40, at §13:117. Indeed, he argues that Congress may not have
the authority to regulate pollution on traditionally navigable waters unless it
has a negative impact on navigation because the Commerce Clause does not
give Congress plenary power to regulate navigable waters, but only power
to protect and promote interstate commerce on navigable waters. For a contrary perspective, see FPL Energy Marine Hydro, LLC v. Federal Energy Reg.
Comm’n, 287 F.3d 1151, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (three canoe trips establish
potential for navigational use).
320. For example, CWA §§102(a), 104(a)(5), & 106(e)(1), 33 U.S.C.
§§1252(a), 1254(a)(5), & 1256(e)(1), authorize plans for improving water
quality in groundwater, monitoring water quality in groundwater, and making grants to state agencies to do the same. CWA §§202(a)(2) & 208(b)
(2)(K), 33 U.S.C. §§1282(a)(2) & 1288(b)(2)(K) authorize grants to state
agencies for programs to protect groundwater quality. CWA §304(a)(1) &
(e), 33 U.S.C. §1314(a)(1) & (e), authorize EPA to establish water criteria
for groundwater, factors to restore groundwater quality, and methods to
control pollution from disposal of pollutant in wells.
		 Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) stated on the House floor that groundwater
appears in the bill in every section, in every title, except Title IV.
It is under the title which provides EPA can study ground water.
It is under the title dealing with definitions. But when it comes
to enforcement, Title IV, the section on permits and licenses, then
ground water is suddenly missing.
92 Cong. Rec. 10,666 (1972) (statement of Rep. Aspin), reprinted in 1
Legis. History, supra note 48, at 727. The author cannot find groundwater
mentioned in Title V, in which the definitional §502 is located. Most lawyers would label §309, 33 U.S.C. §1319, the enforcement section rather
than the sections authorizing permit issuance in Title IV. And many sections
in Titles I, II, and III do not mention groundwater, e.g., §§102A, 103, 206,
207, 307, & 308, 33 U.S.C. §§1252a, 1253, 1286, 1287, 1317, & 1318.
Although the statement is demonstrably wrong in several respects, it has
been uncritically repeated. See, e.g., Anna Makowski, Beneath the Surface
of the Clean Water Act: Exploring the Depth of the Act’s Jurisdictional Scope
of Ground Water Pollution,” 91 Or. L. Rev. 495, 513 (2012); Thomas L.
Casey, Reevaluating “Isolated Waters”: Is Hydrologically Connected Ground
Water “Navigable Water” Under the Clean Water Act, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 159,
171 (2002).
321. All of the statutory references immediately above, except §208(b)(2)(K),
contain either the phrase “navigable waters and ground waters” or “navigable waters or groundwaters.”
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water.322 Legislative history did not distinguish between
isolated groundwater and tributary groundwater,323 a distinction courts subsequently developed to justify holding
discharges to tributary groundwater to be within the jurisdiction of the CWA, while discharges to isolated groundwater are held not to be.
On the other hand, the legislative history is clear that
Congress intended that the term navigable waters be given
its full constitutional reach. The few courts considering
whether groundwater can be within federal Commerce
Clause jurisdiction concluded that it could be,324 although
not under the first prong of the Lopez test, which Congress apparently chose by using “navigable waters” in the
CWA as its jurisdictional claim. Highways of interstate
commerce are inherently surface waters. One twist in the
CWA suggests congressional intent to regulate some discharges to groundwater. Section 402(b)(1)(D) provides that
EPA can approve a state program for administering and
enforcing the §402 permit program only if the state has
authority to issue permits to “control the disposal of pollutants into wells.” In the absence of an approved state §402
program, §402(a)(3) provides that EPA is to administer the
322. In the report accompanying S. 2770 from the Committee on Public Works
to the Senate, the Committee stated that it recognized that the distinction
between surface and groundwaters was artificial. Although the Committee
was concerned with groundwater pollution, it rejected several proposals to
establish federal standards because “the jurisdiction regarding groundwaters
is so complex and varied from State to State.” S. Rep. No. 414, at 73 (1971),
reprinted in 2 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 1491. The Committee also
stated that the problem of groundwater pollution, although serious, was not
as acute as the problem of surface water pollution. Id. It did so after hearings
on the effect of deep well injection on groundwater pollution. See Hearing
on S. 2770 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the S. Comm.
on Pub. Works, 92nd Cong. pt. 7 (1971). See also Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554
F.2d 1310, 1329, 7 ELR 20594 (5th Cir. 1977).
		 After passage of S. 2770, the House Committee on Public Works held
hearings on H.R. 11896, the House counterpart to S. 2770, but differing in
some respects. During the hearings, Representative Aspin proposed amendments adding groundwater control to the bill, because he understood both
the House and Senate bills not to authorize regulation of groundwater pollution. See Hearing on H.R. 11896 Before the H. Comm. on Pub. Works, 92nd
Cong. 727-28 (1972) (statement of Rep. Aspin), reprinted in 1 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 597. Those amendments were not adopted by the
Committee. The only mention of groundwater in the Committee Report
accompanying H.R. 11896 to the House floor is its expectation that EPA
will be diligent in gathering information on deep well injection. See H.R.
Rep. No. 911, at 109 (1972). When the bill reached the House floor, Representative Aspin again introduced his amendment to include groundwater
pollution control in the legislation. See 118 Cong. Rec. 10666 (1972).
Members supporting and opposing the amendment held a lively debate, but
all agreed that the bill as written did not regulate discharges of pollutants to
groundwater. Opposition to the amendment focused primarily on the lack
of information on which to base a regulatory program. After the debate, the
House rejected the proposed amendment. See 118 Cong. Rec. 10666-69
(1972), reprinted in 1 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 597.
323. “Tributary groundwater” is groundwater that flows into surface water; “isolated groundwater” is groundwater that does not flow into surface water.
324. Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965,
24 ELR 21080 (7th Cir. 1994); Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901 F.2d 1419,
1422, 20 ELR 20889 (7th Cir 1990). Indeed, groundwater may be interstate. Many aquifers underlie and flow between multiple states. The best
known is the Ogallala aquifer, underlying eight states: Colorado, Kansas,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.
Groundwater may not ordinarily be a highway of interstate commerce, but
it is used in interstate commerce. The Ogallala aquifer, for example, provides
irrigation water that is a key component in the region’s agriculture. The
Supreme Court held in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 12 ELR 20749
(1982), that groundwater also can be an article in interstate commerce.
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program in the state under the same terms and conditions
as an approved state program. This provision implies that if
EPA is administering the §402 program, it also has authority to issue permits for disposing of pollutants into wells.
Two references to “well” in the definition section of the
statute support this argument,325 suggesting that Congress
intended CWA §402 to regulate discharges through wells.
Because wells lead to groundwater rather than to surface
water, congressional intent to regulate discharges through
wells necessarily includes congressional intent to regulate
discharges to groundwater.
Predictably, the issue of whether the CWA regulates
discharges to groundwater was first raised with regard to
discharges of pollutants into groundwater through waste
disposal wells, a waste disposal method known as deep
well injection. In the first reported case, United States
v. GAF Corp., EPA sought injunctive relief against the
construction of deep wells for chemical waste disposal
without a §402 permit.326 EPA relied on the inclusion of
discharges through wells in §§402 and 502, while the
defendant relied on the legislative history. The district
court held that “[d]isposal of chemical wastes into underground waters which have not been alleged to flow into or
otherwise affect surface waters does not constitute a ‘discharge of a pollutant’ within the meaning of” §301(a).327
It so held because of explicit legislative history that the
CWA did not regulate discharges to groundwater, while
EPA’s §§402 and 502 arguments were “back-door.”328
“Congress could not possibly have meant to achieve in
roundabout fashion what it expressly declined to accomplish straightforwardly,”329 the court said. While legislative history may not trump statutory content as easily
today,330 it was quite the fashion at the time.331 It is significant, however, that the district court in GAF noted the
polluted groundwater at issue was not tributary groundwater, suggesting that the court might have been open to
a different result if the groundwater was tributary.
In the next deep well decision, U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Train,332 the petitioner sought judicial review of EPA’s per325. The definition of “point source” gives “well” as an example of conveyances
included in that term, CWA §502(14). The definition of “pollutant” excludes “material which is injected into a well to facilitate the production
of oil or gas” under stated conditions, CWA §502(6). There would be no
reason to exclude the injection of material into wells if injection of materials
into groundwater was not otherwise prohibited by the CWA.
326. United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 5 ELR 20581 (S.D. Tex.
1975).
327. Id. at 1383.
328. Id. at 1384. In his majority opinion in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468, 31 ELR 20512 (2001), Justice Scalia made
a similar point more colorfully, saying that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”
329. GAF, 389 F. Supp. at 1385.
330. See Eskridge, supra note 17, at 207-38; Scalia & Garner, supra note 17, at
369-90 (discussing one of their Thirteen Falsities Exposed).
331. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Grp., 426 U.S. 1, 10-23, 6
ELR 20549 (1976), in which the Court held that the inclusion of radioactive materials in the definition of pollutant in CWA §502(6) did not authorize EPA to regulate the discharge of “radioactive materials from nuclear
power plants,” largely because explicit legislative history trumped the plain
meaning of the statute.
332. 556 F.2d 822, 7 ELR 20419 (7th Cir. 1977).

6-2015

mit for discharges of pollutants to surface water and for
discharges to groundwater from a deep injection well at
the same facility. Upholding EPA’s action, the Seventh
Circuit distinguished GAF as an action against discharge
to groundwater alone, not in conjunction with the control of discharges to surface water.333 The Seventh Circuit
was convinced by EPA’s argument that §402(a)(1) authorizes the Agency, in the absence of an approved state permit program, to issue permits “subject to the same terms,
conditions and requirements” as apply to approved state
permit programs, including the authority to regulate pollutants discharged into wells in §402(b)(1)(D).334 The court
found support for that interpretation of the statute in the
definition of pollutant in §502(6), which excludes material
injected into wells in association with the production of oil
and gas, an exclusion that would have no meaning unless
the material would be a pollutant when discharged into
wells absent the exclusion.335 Finally, the court found support for that interpretation in the limited CWA legislative
history referring to deep well injection, although it ignored
substantial contrary legislative history regarding discharges
to groundwater generally.336
The Fifth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in
Exxon Corp. v. Train,337 when it reviewed EPA’s claim of
authority to regulate discharges of wastes through deep
wells to groundwater as part of a §402 permit that the
Agency issued to regulate discharges of pollutants to surface waters from the same facility. EPA did not argue that
§301(a) prohibited discharges to groundwater, but only
that the Agency had ancillary authority to issue permits
for deep well injection by facilities also requiring CWA
permits to discharge into surface navigable water under
§402(a)(3) and (b)(1)(D).338 This limited claim of authority
was articulated in an opinion by EPA’s Office of General
Counsel.339 While the court commented that EPA’s interpretation was “not implausible,” it concluded that the distinction the Agency drew between deep well injection at
a facility with a surface water discharge and injection at a
facility with no surface water discharge had “the strange
result of dividing jurisdiction over deep-well injections
between federal and state authorities, based on the apparently fortuitous factor of whether the person engaging in
the deep-well injection also happens to be engaging in
‘associated’ surface discharges.”340
333. Id. at 851 n.60.
334. Id. at 852.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 852-53. This legislative history was from House and Senate Committee Reports explaining the exclusion from the definition of pollutant in
§502(6)(B) of material pumped into a deep well incident to the production
of oil or gas.
337. 554 F.2d 1310, 7 ELR 20594 (5th Cir. 1977). Despite its earlier publication in the Federal Reporter, Exxon was decided six weeks after the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in U.S. Steel Corp., 556 F.2d 822, although that decision
does not mention U.S. Steel.
338. Exxon, 554 F.2d at 1318-19.
339. EPA Gen’l Counsel Op. (Dec. 13, 1973), quoted in Exxon, 554 F.2d at 1320
n.21. The General Counsel reiterated this interpretation of the CWA in
1975, distinguishing United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 5 ELR
20581 (S.D. Tex. 1975). See Exxon, 554 F.2d at 1320 n.21.
340. Exxon, 554 F.2d at 1322.
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Consequently, the Fifth Circuit proceeded with an
exhaustive examination of the statute’s structure and legislative history. It stated that references to groundwater in
the CWA establish a “pattern . . . of federal information
gathering and encouragement of state efforts to control
groundwater pollution but not of direct federal control
over groundwater pollution.”341 Moreover, the court said
that the legislative history “demonstrates conclusively that
Congress believed it was not granting the Administrator any power to control disposals into groundwater.”342
Acknowledging the logic of EPA’s argument based on
§402(a)(3) and (b)(1)(D), the court concluded that “[w]
e cannot attribute to Congress an intention to achieve
silently and by indirection that which it constantly refused
to do directly.”343 Like the Texas district court in GAF, the
Fifth Circuit left the door open to the argument that discharges to tributary groundwater were prohibited.344
The controversy over EPA’s authority to regulate deep
well injection under the CWA subsequently disappeared
because Congress gave EPA direct regulatory authority
over deep well injection in the Safe Drinking Water Act
of 1974.345 The controversy resurfaced tangentially when
EPA ordered a steel company to take corrective remedial
action with regard to its leaking hazardous waste injection
wells under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA).346 In Inland Steel Co. v. EPA,347 the respondent
raised as a defense an exemption in RCRA §6903(27) for
materials in “industrial discharges which are point sources
subject to permits under” CWA §402, claiming that the
well was a point source adding pollutants to groundwater.348 The Seventh Circuit’s decision by Judge Richard Posner suggested that its earlier U.S. Steel decision might be
“all wet” and held the RCRA exemption inapplicable for a
variety of reasons unrelated to this discussion.349
The issue of whether unpermitted discharges to groundwater are prohibited by CWA §301(a) shifted from deep
well injection to the discharge of pollutants from surface
activities into groundwater. In this context, courts have frequently distinguished between discharges to groundwater
with no known or alleged connection with surface navigable water, often called isolated groundwater, and groundwater known or alleged to be tributary to nearby surface
navigable water, often called tributary groundwater.350
A small number of decisions hold that the CWA does
not regulate discharges into any groundwater, isolated
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1329.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1312, n.1.
345. Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§300f to 300j-26, ELR
Stat. SDWA §§1401-1465.
346. 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6992k, ELR Stat. RCRA §§1001-11011.
347. 901 F.2d 1419, 20 ELR 20889 (7th Cir. 1990).
348. The exclusion is in the definition of solid waste, of which hazardous waste is
a subset.
349. Inland Steel, 901 F.2d at 1423-24.
350. Makowski, supra note 320, at 506, suggests a possibly more useful set of
classifications of groundwater, drawn from state groundwater regulation
statutes: underground streams; percolating groundwater; and subflow from
surface streams.
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or tributary.351 The most considered of those decisions,
Umatilla Waterquality Protective Association, Inc. v. Smith
Frozen Foods, Inc.,352 concerned discharges into allegedly
tributary groundwater. The district court recited the legislative history that Congress rejected legislation covering
discharges to groundwater in the CWA,353 and the statute’s
repeated use of the phrase “navigable waters and ground
waters,”354 suggesting Congress recognized these to be two
distinct categories of water. Finally, the decision noted that
“EPA has offered no formal or consistent interpretation of
the CWA that would subject discharges to groundwater
to the [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System]
NPDES permitting requirement.”355 Indeed, the district
court quoted from the Opinion of EPA’s General Counsel
referred to in the U.S. Steel and Exxon decisions that “discharges into ground waters are not included” in the definition of “discharge of a pollutant” in CWA §502(12).356
Umatilla cited two instances in which EPA restricted
its regulatory authority over discharges to groundwater
to conform to EPA’s general counsel opinion,357 although
the court ignored the fact that the Agency had sued GAF
Corp. for unpermitted deep well injection into isolated
groundwater, as well as the preamble to an EPA rulemaking in which the Agency noted that the NPDES program
did not apply to groundwater “unless there is a hydrological connection between the ground water and a nearby surface water body”—in other words, unless the groundwater
is tributary to nearby surface water.358 Umatilla criticized
opinions holding that discharges to tributary groundwater
were covered by the CWA’s permitting program for failing
to deal with EPA’s disavowal of authority over discharges to
groundwater.359 It noted, however, that if EPA amended its
CWA regulations to cover discharges to tributary ground351. Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 22 ELR 21337
(1st Cir. 1992), is sometimes said to be such a precedent. The decision did
not consider whether a CWA permit was required for a discharge into
groundwater, but whether groundwater was navigable water in the context
of the Corps’ consideration of alternatives in determining whether to issue
a CWA §404 permit for the filling of wetlands. The First Circuit’s analysis
of the issue was terse, covering only 10 lines. A subsequent district court
decision analyzing Town of Norfolk concluded that the decision did not hold
“that groundwater is categorically excluded from consideration as ‘waters
of the United States,’ but rather that such a determination requires an ‘ecological judgment,’ to be made according to the particular characteristics of
the site.” Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 175, 179
(D.P.R. 2009). Moreover, the First Circuit was not interpreting the CWA,
but instead the Corps’ regulations, and it was not considering whether discharges to groundwater constituted discharges to navigable water for purposes of CWA jurisdiction. On close examination, Town of Norfolk appears
to be wholly irrelevant to the inquiry here.
352. 962 F. Supp. 1312, 27 ELR 21411 (D. Or. 1997).
353. Id. at 1318-19.
354. Id. at 1318.
355. Id. at 1319. Subsequently, the preamble to EPA’s proposed effluent guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) stated that
EPA applied a direct hydrologic connection test to determine whether a
discharge required a §402 permit, see 66 Fed. Reg. 2960 (Jan. 12, 2001),
but did not reflect that statement in its final rule, see 40 C.F.R. pt. 412.
356. Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1319 (emphasis added by the district court).
357. Id. See 38 Fed. Reg. 13528 (May 22, 1977); 44 Fed. Reg. 32854 (June 7,
1979).
358. 55 Fed. Reg. 47990, 47997 (Nov. 16, 1990).
359. Note that the court itself failed to recognize that in GAF, EPA asserted
jurisdiction over discharges to isolated groundwater.
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water, the court would give that interpretation Chevron
deference.360 A second district court decision, Kelley v.
United States,361 covered much the same ground, but in
lesser detail. The plaintiffs in both cases alleged that pollutants discharged to groundwater flowed into nearby surface
navigable water.362
Other decisions have held that the CWA’s jurisdiction
does not extend to groundwater because the plaintiffs did
not allege the discharges were to tributary groundwater363 or
alleged only “the possibility” of a hydrological connection
between the groundwater and surface navigable water.364
These decisions do not explicitly foreclose the assertion of
jurisdiction over discharges to tributary groundwater.
Encouraged by a pioneering law review article,365 a
number of decisions hold that discharges of pollutants to
tributary groundwater are within the jurisdiction of the
CWA.366 They all accept that the CWA’s legislative history
establishes Congress had no intent to protect groundwater
generally from pollution or to generally regulate discharges
to groundwater. They counter, however, that, in the words
of an Idaho district court, “Congress’s decision not to comprehensively regulate groundwater as part of the CWA,
does not require the conclusion that Congress intended
to exempt groundwater from all regulation—particularly
under circumstances where the introduction of pollutants
into the groundwater adversely affects the adjoining sur360. Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1319 n.2. Another court refusing to interpret
navigable waters to include groundwater commented that if EPA amended its regulations to include tributary groundwater, that would “pose a
harder question.” Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp.,
24 F.3d 962, 966, 24 ELR 21080 (7th Cir. 1994). But see id. at 966 (concurring op.).
361. 618 F. Supp. 1103, 16 ELR 20080 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
362. Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1313-14; Kelley, 618 F. Supp. at 1104-05.
363. In GAF, for instance, EPA did not allege contaminated groundwater flowed
into navigable waters. See United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379,
1383, 5 ELR 20581 (S.D. Tex. 1975). In Exxon, EPA did not allege contaminated groundwater flowed into navigable waters and the court specifically noted that it voiced no opinion on whether CWA jurisdiction would
exist if the discharge was to tributary waters. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d
1310, 1312 n.1, 7 ELR 20594 (5th Cir. 1977).
364. Village of Oconomowoc Lake, 24 F.3d at 966. The “possibility” of contaminated pond water entering groundwater and thereafter migrating to surface
navigable waters does not establish CWA jurisdiction.
365. Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges Into Groundwater: The Critical
Link in Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 Harv. Env’t L. Rev.
369-426 (1988). She has been followed by others, all arguing for the recognition of tributary groundwater as navigable. See, e.g., Makowski, supra
note 320; James W. Hayman, Regulating Point Source Discharges to Ground
Water Hydrologically Connected to Navigable Waters: An Unresolved Question
of Environmental Protection Agency Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 5
Barry L. Rev. 95 (2005); and Casey, supra note 320.
366. Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 15 ELR 20530 (10th Cir. 1985);
Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (Puerto Rico), 599 F. Supp. 2d 175
(D.P.R. 2009); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D.
Idaho 2001), aff’d on other grounds, 305 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 2002); Friends
of Santa Fe Cnty. v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 26 ELR 20135
(D.N.M. 1995); Washington Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870
F. Supp. 983, 25 ELR 20661 (E.D. Wash. 1994); Sierra Club v. Colorado
Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 24 ELR 20749 (D. Colo. 1993); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 431, 20
ELR 20870 (E.D. Cal. 1989), 707 F. Supp. 1182, 19 ELR 20124 (E.D.
Cal. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 47 F.3d 325, 25 ELR 20628 (9th Cir.
1995). See also New York v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 374, 381, 16 ELR
20142 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (commenting that discharges to tributary groundwater may be subject to CWA jurisdiction, but not reaching the question).
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face waters.”367 Although none of the decisions discuss it,
the legislative history simply does not deal with tributary
groundwater or pollution of surface water by groundwater.
The decisions distinguish most negative precedents as
dealing with isolated rather than with tributary groundwater, and conclude that the logic of the decisions holding tributary groundwater to be protected by the statute
is, in the words of a Washington district court, “compelling: since the goal of the CWA is to protect the quality
of surface waters, any pollutant which enters such waters,
whether directly or through groundwater, is subject to
regulation.”368 They might add that allowing such pollution without a permit creates a giant loophole in the CWA;
a factory adjacent to a river can evade the CWA simply by
aiming its discharge pipe to dry land rather than the river,
at least if its flow is low enough to percolate into the soil
rather than simply running off over the surface into the
river. (The same could be said of pollution of surface waters
by converting point source discharges to nonpoint source
discharges.369) Although some of these decisions held that
discharges to the tributary groundwater in question were
regulated by the CWA, most were decisions on preliminary
motions. When the plaintiffs prevailed on preliminary
motions, the courts often commented that they would hold
plaintiffs to a high standard of proof at trial that the pollutants discharged to groundwater actually reached navigable
surface water.370 Courts sometimes denied the plaintiffs’
motions for summary judgment because of conflicting evidence on the facts.371
The plurality in Rapanos did not address these situations, but its repeated insistence that tributaries or wetlands must have surface connections with navigable water
to be navigable themselves372 suggests that those Justices
would not be amenable to the argument that groundwater
tributary to nearby surface water could be navigable. The
plurality, however, did suggest that additions to navigable
water need not be direct, implying they may be indirect.373
This invites the argument that the direct addition of a pollutant to groundwater flowing to nearby navigable water is
an indirect addition to the navigable water into which the
groundwater flows. That, however, is an interpretation of
the “addition” element of the CWA offense, rather than
of the “navigable waters” element. Because neither Justice
367. See, e.g., Idaho Rural Council, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (emphasis added).
368. See, e.g., Washington Wilderness Coal., 870 F. Supp. at 990.
369. See the dissent in United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 65354, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir. 1993) (dissenting op.).
370. See, e.g., Idaho Rural Council, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1180; Washington Wilderness Coal., 870 F. Supp. at 990.
371. See, e.g., Friends of Santa Fe Cnty., 892 F. Supp. at 1358; McClellan Ecological
Seepage Situation, 763 F. Supp. at 428, 707 F. Supp. 1182, vacated on other
grounds, 47 F.3d 325.
372. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
373. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (“The Act does not forbid ‘the addition of any
pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’ but rather the
‘addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.”). The argument for indirect
addition by aerial spraying of pesticides near water and other discharges
to air that reach water is developed in Amil Anthony, Shotguns, Spray, and
Smoke: Regulating Atmospheric Deposition of Pollutants Under the Clean Water
Act, 29 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 215 (2011). The argument is criticized
in Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10797-98.
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Kennedy’s concurring opinion nor the dissenting opinion insisted on surface connections to navigable waters, a
majority of the Supreme Court might be persuaded that
tributary groundwater is a jurisdictional tributary.
The easy answer to whether unpermitted discharges to
groundwater are prohibited by CWA §301(a) is that they
are not. That conclusion is supported by the legislative history, the structure of the statute, and the failures of both
Congress and EPA to mention groundwater in their definitions of navigable water. The significance of the Agency’s
omission is underscored by the length and detail of its definition of waters of the United States, by far the longest and
most detailed of EPA’s definitions of the CWA’s jurisdictional terms. Some groundwater could be covered by the
“tributaries” part of EPA’s definition. The easy answer is
also supported by the plurality decision in Rapanos, which
twice states that only wetlands “with a continuous surface
connection” with navigable water are within the regulatory
jurisdiction of §404.374 (Rapanos is a §404 case and the
plurality did not consider the jurisdiction of §402.) But
the relevant canon of construction is to interpret a term in
the same manner throughout a statute.375 Supporting this
canon, CWA §502 provides that its definitions are to be
applied throughout the statute unless otherwise specifically
indicated in the statute.
The difficult answer to the question of whether unpermitted discharges to groundwater are prohibited by CWA
§301 is that unpermitted discharges to tributary groundwater are prohibited, but not discharges to other groundwater, including isolated groundwater. In addition to the
legal arguments against it, this answer requires determining when groundwater is connected to nearby surface navigable water. Such a determination is difficult both in proof
and in legal distinction. The flow of surface tributaries to
navigable waters may be traced visibly by walking beside
them or by taking images of them from an aerial camera.
Tracing the flow of underground tributaries is much more
uncertain. But even when such underground connections
are known, are there geographic or temporal lines between
tributary and non-tributary groundwater? Human-caused
pollution of soil on property adjacent to navigable water,
when the pollutants visibly enter surface water from the
flow of groundwater through the bank, either below or
above the surface of the navigable water, is easy and logical to classify as tributary water. But what about polluted
waters that, as the Tenth Circuit put it, “soak into the
earth’s surface, become part of the underground aquifers,
and after a lengthy period, perhaps centuries, the underground water moves toward eventual discharge” into
tributaries of navigable water miles away?376 Because of its
374. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion rejected this conclusion, see Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 772-74 (Kennedy,
J., concurring), as did the dissenting opinion, see Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 80406 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
375. See Eskridge, supra note 17 at 324; Scalia & Garner, supra note 17, at
170-73.
376. See Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126,129, 15 ELR 20530 (10th
Cir. 1985).
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adjacency, the riverside example might even be approved
under the plurality opinion in Rapanos, but the remote
example surely would not.377
Perhaps the tributary groundwater theory should be
confined to situations where the pollution originates on
property adjacent to navigable water or its tributary. That
would prevent most polluters from evading the CWA’s permit requirements by dumping pollutants on the ground
near a navigable water where they percolate to groundwater,
which in turn takes them to that navigable surface water.
The adjacency requirement is analogous to the Refuse Act,
which prohibits depositing refuse on the bank of navigable
water or its tributary from which it may wash into the navigable water.378 Legislative history suggests that Congress
intended the CWA to regulate at least as much pollution
as the Refuse Act regulated.379 This limited application is
also analogous to the adjacency requirement for wetlands
under §404. Such cases would not involve the parties and
the courts in protracted and difficult factual inquiries. This
is a fairly easy limiting principle to apply, unless, of course,
the adjacent property is the King Ranch or some other very
large property.
EPA should reconsider its un-nuanced exclusion of all
groundwater in its proposed definition of navigable waters.
The Agency could make a credible case for including a
groundwater tributary to nearby or adjacent surface navigable water within its definition of waters of the United
States. Indeed, although EPA’s proposed amendment to
its definition specifically excludes groundwater, it does
provide that shallow subsurface hydrological connection
between a wetland and a jurisdictional water may make
the wetland jurisdictional,380 very much the same as tributary groundwater. Most courts holding groundwater not
to be navigable waters did so in cases where there were no
allegations that the discharges were to tributary groundwater, and commented that they may have held differently if
the discharges had been to tributary groundwater.381 Such
courts may well have ruled otherwise if EPA had promulgated a rule including tributary groundwater in its definition of waters of the United States.
377. The plurality opinion in Rapanos specifically disapproves of Quivira. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 726.
378. 33 U.S.C. §407.
379. The Senate Committee Report accompanying S. 2770 indicated that the
prohibition of the CWA adopted “the basic formula [from the Refuse Act,
but added] . . . municipal discharges to it, so [that] before any material
can be added to navigable waters authorization must first be granted by
the Administrator.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3742. See United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 110-11, 7 ELR 20253
(6th Cir. 1977). The comment was made specifically with regard to the
definition of pollutant, but applies as well to the broader definition of
“discharge of a pollutant.”
380. 79 Fed. Reg. 22188, 22268 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014), to be codified at 40
C.F.R. §122.2(b)(5)(vi) [the exclusion of groundwater] and (c)(2) & (3)
[shallow subsurface hydrologic connections].
381. See, e.g., Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d
962, 966, 24 ELR 21080 (7th Cir. 1994); Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d
1310, 1312 n.1, 7 ELR 20594 (5th Cir. 1977); Umatilla Waterquality Prot.
Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1319, 27 ELR
21411 (D. Or. 1997) (groundwater at issue was tributary, but EPA rule did
not cover it); United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1388, 5 ELR
20581 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
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Instead, the Agency’s proposed amendment to its definition of waters of the United States simply excludes groundwater even if it otherwise meets the definition of waters of
the United States.382 This exclusion is unnecessary to meet
the Supreme Court’s concerns: It has never considered a
case in which a defendant added pollutants to groundwater
that was tributary to nearby navigable water, evading the
CWA’s regulatory program. The majority of the Court in
Rapanos (that is, all of the Justices other than those in the
plurality) was not fixated on surface connections and might
be persuaded that such groundwater could be a tributary
to waters of the United States. Even if groundwater flowing
into nearby navigable water is not itself navigable, adding
pollutants to that groundwater could be an indirect addition of the pollutants to navigable water, a proposition with
which the plurality in Rapanos might conceivably agree.
In any event, if the pollutants are hazardous, many of the
discharges to groundwater would be subject to RCRA.383

D.

EPA’s Unitary Navigable Waters Theory and
Water Transfer Rule

A water transfer is the diversion of some or all of the
water from one water body to another for intervening or
subsequent human use. Water transfers are often accomplished by point sources: pumps; pipes; canals; and ditches.
Assuming that the first water body is heavily polluted and
the second is pristine, under traditional CWA analysis,
the discharge of the polluted water into the pristine water
through a point source would require a §402 permit. Under
EPA’s recently promulgated water transfer rule, however,
the discharge is exempted from requiring a permit unless
pollutants are added by human use (except for agricultural
purposes) of the water between diversion and discharge.
EPA justified the rule with two theories. The first and
better-articulated theory is that when viewed as a whole,
the CWA strikes a grand balance between its federal program to improve and protect water quality and preexisting state programs to allocate the uses of scarce water
resources, highly developed private property systems, at
least in the western United States.384 Water resource management in the arid West, where water diversions are criti382. 79 Fed. Reg. 22188, 22269 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014), to be codified at 40
C.F.R. §122.2, Waters of the United States, (b)(5)(vi). At the same time, it
defines waters of the United States to include wetlands and other waters
“adjacent” to navigable waters; defines “adjacent” to include “neighboring”;
and defines “neighboring” to include a “shallow subsurface hydrologic connection” between a wetland and navigable water. See (a)(6), (c)(1) & (2).
Query: Is that an exception to the exclusion of groundwater? Does the shallow hydrological connection exception treat wetlands more favorably than
traditional tributaries?
383. 42 U.S.C. §6925(a).
384. Western water law provides that the right of the first person to divert and
use water from a particular water source is superior to the rights of persons
later diverting and using water from the same source. Subsequent diverters
may exercise their rights only when the senior diverter has used his full allocation of water. Eastern water law, based on common law, traditionally
limits the right to divert and use water to landowners adjoining a water body
and requires them to share and share alike during times of water scarcity. For
a detailed descriptions of both western and eastern water law, see Tarlock,
supra note 32.
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cal to irrigated agriculture and municipal water supplies,
is an important aspect of the area’s economy and state
legal systems. This is the Agency’s “holistic theory” of the
CWA. EPA’s second theory supporting the water transfer
rule is that all navigable waters are one, so that when polluted navigable water is discharged into a pristine navigable
water, the polluted navigable water adds no pollutants to
the pristine water because both waters are the same water.
This is the Agency’s “unitary navigable water theory.”
The Agency bases its holistic theory on four brief passages in the CWA, which it argues create a balance between
water quality and water quantity, thereby removing water
transfers from the definition of “addition” and exempting
them from requiring CWA permits.385 None of the four
passages suggests that “addition” excludes water transfers
or that water transfers are exempt or can be exempted from
requiring a CWA permit when they add pollutants from
one water body to another water body. EPA’s water transfer
rule is such a significant departure from the pattern and
concerns of the CWA that it should not be upheld unless
Congress clearly intended it. That intent is not clear from
the four brief statutory passages proffered by EPA, consisting of three subsections and one paragraph in a 200-page
statute with more than 500 subsections and 800 paragraphs, the rest of which are unambiguously focused on
promoting pollution control.
The Southern District of New York recently heard a
consolidated challenge to the rule and vacated it in Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.386 The Eleventh Circuit, however, in Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water
Management District,387 had earlier accorded Chevron deference to the rule when it was raised as a defense in a citizen suit against an unpermitted water transfer of polluted
water. Catskill Mountains is the most recent, and also the
most comprehensive, decision on the water transfer issue.
It has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.388
EPA enunciated its unitary navigable waters theory in
its amicus brief in South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida.389 Although
its brief suggested that the Agency had always subscribed
to the theory, the earlier instances it cited merely foreshadowed the theory rather than articulating it.390 Indeed, former EPA officials including former Administrator Carol
Browner filed an amicus brief indicating that EPA had
385. The four passages are CWA §§101(b), 101(g), 304(f ) & 510(2); 33 U.S.C.
§§1251 (b), 1251(g), 1314(f ) & 1370(2).
386. 8 F. Supp. 3d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), 2014 WL 128544.
387. 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
388. The Second Circuit is already on record as holding that the CWA unambiguously requires permits for water transfers, Catskill Mtns. Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 1273 (2d Cir. 1996), making
it likely that it will affirm the district court’s decision. If it does so, then because that would create a circuit split between the Second Circuit in Catskill
Mtns. and the Eleventh Circuit in Friends of the Everglades, and because the
Supreme Court left the unitary navigable water theory open in Miccosukee,
the Court may well grant certiorari.
389. 541 U.S. 95, 105-06, 34 ELR 20021 (2004).
390. Id. at 107-08.
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not subscribed to the theory during their tenures there.391
EPA did not evoke the theory in its Water Transfer Interpretation392 or in its proposed Water Transfer Rule or the
preamble accompanying it393; additionally, some of the
wording used in the preamble to the proposed rule394 and
repeated more than once in the preamble to the final rule
are inconsistent with the theory.395
Moreover, the Water Transfer Interpretation and the
preamble to the proposed rule both stated that the “precise legal question addressed” was whether a water transfer was an addition; nowhere was it suggested that the
definition of navigable waters was at issue. Finally, the
Interpretation stated explicitly that it did “not address
the meaning of . . . navigable waters.”396 Although all
three documents reiterated that the precise397 or principal398 legal issue was the definition of addition, none of
them enunciated the meaning of addition. Instead, all
three justified the water transfer policy or rule’s exclusion
of water transfers from the requirement of a CWA §402
permit on the basis of a holistic interpretation of the statute favoring water transfers being regulated by authorities
other than federal and state pollution control authorities.399 EPA’s frequent shifting between the elements it is
interpreting and the theories it uses to interpret them in
this contest is a shell game.400
EPA’s preamble to its final rule embraces the unitary
navigable waters theory as a justification for the water
transfer rule, although as a subsidiary argument and in a
conclusory manner:
Thus, there is no “addition”; nothing is being added “to”
“the waters of the United States” by virtue of the water
transfer, because the pollutant at issue is already part
of “the waters of the United States” to begin with . . . .
When a pollutant is conveyed along with, and already
subsumed entirely within, navigable waters and the water
is not diverted for an intervening use, the water never loses
its status as “waters of the United States,” and nothing is
added to those waters from the outside world.401
391. See Brief for Carol Browner et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Fla., South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians of Fla. 541 U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004), 2003 WL 22793539.
Former EPA Administrator Browner was joined in the amicus brief by two
former assistant administrators for EPA’s Water Programs, and two former
general counsels.
392. EPA Interpretation on Applicability of CWA §402 to Water Transfers
(2005) [hereinafter EPA Interpretation], available at http://www.epa.gov/
ogc/documents/water_transfers.pdf.
393. 71 Fed. Reg. 32887 (June 6, 2006).
394. A water transfer “conveys waters of the United States to another water of the
United States.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 32891.
395. 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33699 (a water transfer “diverts a water of the United
States to a second water of the United States.”) (emphasis added). Id. at
33704.
396. EPA Interpretation, supra note 392, at 18, n.19.
397. See Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10784-85.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Or perhaps it is evidence the documents were written by different members of a committee with insufficient editorial control to produce consistent documents.
401. 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33701.
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This preamble is drawn directly from EPA’s brief in
Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District,402 with no further authority or justification
except an implicit reference to National Wildlife Federation
v. Consumers Power Co.403
EPA’s unitary navigable waters theory is a startling and
counterintuitive notion. If Congress intended to incorporate such an unexpected theory or policy into the CWA,
surely it would have explicitly articulated it in the statute
or at least discussed it in the legislative history. However,
Congress did not mention or even hint at the theory in
either the statute or its legislative history. The only wording
EPA can point to in the statute to support the notion is an
inference from the presence of the word “any” before the
terms “addition,” “pollutant,” “point source,” and “person,”
but not before the term “navigable waters” in §§301(a) and
502(12). EPA argues that, for example, “any” before “pollutant” signifies there are many different pollutants, any
one of which could support a violation of the CWA. By
the same token, the Agency argues that the absence of the
word “any” before “navigable waters” signifies that there is
only one aggregate navigable waters that can support a violation, not many individual navigable waters. EPA argues
that this is consistent with use of the singular nouns “addition,” “pollutant,” and “point source,” and of the plural
noun “waters” in §§301(a) and 502(12). Congress did not
explain why it used the plural form of navigable waters and
the singular forms of the other elements.
The difference between “navigable water” and “navigable waters” is not at all clear. Indeed, in his plurality
opinion in Rapanos, Justice Scalia used dictionary definitions to argue that the singular “water” is more extensive
than the plural “waters.”404 However, Congress used the
words water and waters interchangeably in the statute,405
and elsewhere provided that unless “the context indicates
otherwise,” the use of a singular noun in a statute incorporates the plural of that noun, and the use of a plural noun
in a statute incorporates the singular of that noun.406 This
parallels the canon of statutory construction that absent
a contrary indication in a statute, “the singular includes
the plural (and vice versa).”407 Nothing in the definitions of
“discharge of a pollutant” or “navigable waters” indicates
differently.408 Indeed, the CWA’s water quality standards
and §404 programs would be rendered meaningless by
EPA’s unitary navigable water theory.409 The argument that
402. See id.; Friends of the Everglades v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d
1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
403. 862 F.2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir. 1988).
404. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
405. For example, CWA §101(a) uses “waters” in (1) and “water” in (2).
406. 1 U.S.C. §1.
407. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 17, at 129-31.
408. CWA §502(7) & (12); 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) & (12).
409. It is most likely that Congress used “navigable waters” in the CWA definition of “discharge of a pollutant” only because it consciously adopted the
jurisdiction and the permit program from the Refuse Act, and the Refuse
Act forbade the discharge of refuse into the plural “navigable waters” without a permit from the Corps. Congress most likely used “navigable waters”
in the Refuse Act because Congress used the term throughout the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §407.
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the absence of “any” before “navigable waters” in §502(12)
exempts water transfers from §402 or creates one unitary
body of water from all navigable waters is countered by
Justice Scalia’s comment that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouse holes.”410
The CWA is premised on treating navigable waters into
which pollutants are discharged as singular waters rather
than as one whole navigable water. This is most evident
in the CWA’s water quality standards program and in the
§404 permit program for filling wetlands. The CWA’s
water quality standards program is based on the strategy of
the earlier FWPCA to regulate the discharge of pollutants
to interstate waters. The basic strategy of this program is for
states to designate how they desire particular waterways to
be used—for example, drinking water without treatment,
body contact sports, fish propagation, non-body contact
sports, or agricultural and industrial use. Next, the state
designates pollutant criteria for each use, primarily concentrations of pollutants in the water that are safe for the
particular use designated. Thus, different water bodies will
have different uses designated and different criteria for the
pollutants found in them. The states are then to reduce
pollution from point and nonpoint sources in a particular
water body sufficiently to meet the criteria designated for
that water body.
This is inherently a regulatory strategy that requires
treating each water body as a separate entity rather than as
a part of one whole unitary water body. Treating navigable
waters as unitary navigable water suggests one use and one
set of criteria. The CWA is replete with requirements for
states to regulate the water pollution of separate water bodies or portions thereof rather than of one whole body of
water.411 EPA’s unitary navigable water theory is inconsistent with this strategy of water pollution control. Because
Congress established the water quality standards strategy
but did not mention the incompatible unitary navigable
waters theory, that theory is a chimera.
If the unitary navigable water theory is inconsistent
with the water quality strategy, it reads much of §404 out
of the CWA. Section 404 requires a permit for adding
dredged or fill material to navigable waters. The provision
was enacted to regulate the disposal of dredged spoil by
Corps-permitted projects to enhance waterborne transportation by deepening navigation channels and harbors. The
dredged spoil was most easily and economically disposed
of in water or low-lying coastal wetlands. If all navigable
waters were one, no §404 permit would be needed to redeposit dredged spoil from one navigable water to another
because both navigable waters would be one. Most recent
§404 enforcement actions arise from unpermitted wetland
clearing activities. In the typical wetland clearing case, a
developer removes vegetation, levels the land, and perhaps
digs a drainage ditch, redepositing the vegetative mate410. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468, 31 ELR
20512 (2001).
411. See CWA §302(a), 33 U.S.C. §1312(a), providing for “attainment or maintenance of . . . water quality in a specific portion of the navigable waters . . . .”
(emphasis added). See also Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10789-90.
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rial and soil on other parts of the wetland. This redeposit
is held to be the addition of material to navigable waters
from a point source that requires a permit.412 If all navigable waters are one, however, no §404 permit would be
needed for redeposit of material in landclearing operations,
because all parts of the wetland would be the same navigable water.
In the wetlands land-filling cases, another EPA theory
would thwart prosecution: the Agency’s theory that “addition” must be from the “outside world.” Removing material from a wetland and redepositing it elsewhere in the
same wetland does not add it from elsewhere.413 Together,
these two EPA theories could narrow §404 jurisdiction
only to cases in which fill material from dry land is discharged into water.
EPA contends that because “Congress explicitly forbade
discharges of dredged material except in compliance with”
a §404 permit, the unitary navigable water theory and the
outside world theory have no effect on the §404 program.414
But its contention only tells us that dredged material is a
pollutant, not whether the water into which it is deposited
is navigable or whether the deposit is an addition. Perhaps
the Agency is suggesting that its theory does not apply to
§404, but only to §402. But EPA does not explicitly make
that argument, and the argument cannot survive either the
canon of statutory interpretation that one word or term
must be interpreted to have the same meaning throughout a statute unless the statute provides otherwise,415 or the
statement to the same effect in the lead-in to the CWA’s
definition of navigable waters in §502.416

VI. Conclusion
Congress defined navigable waters as the waters of the
United States, intending that the jurisdiction of the CWA
extend as far as constitutionally possible. At first, courts
followed EPA’s lead and legislative history to interpret the
terms expansively under both §§402 and 404. The Supreme
Court, however, gradually narrowed the CWA’s navigable
waters jurisdiction, mindful of the fact that the Court itself
had developed the meaning of that term as a highway of
interstate and foreign waterborne commerce under the
Commerce Clause over the course of more than one-and-ahalf century of its opinions. By basing the CWA’s jurisdiction on a term with an already-developed meaning under
the Commerce Clause, Congress invited courts to interpret
the CWA’s jurisdiction with some regard to its traditional
connection with waterborne commerce. That effectively
narrowed “navigable waters” under the CWA to the first of
the three Lopez prongs of interstate and foreign commerce
412. Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10800-01.
413. Id. at 10778-79.
414. 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33703 (June 13, 2008).
415. Eskridge, supra note 17, at 324, Scalia & Garner, supra note 17, at
167-69.
416. 33 U.S.C. §1362 (“Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used
in this chapter: . . . (7) the term ‘navigable waters,’ means the waters of the
United States. . . .”).
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jurisdiction: use as a highway of commerce. The tension
between congressional intent and judicial interpretation
has been particularly acute under §404, where agricultural
landclearing activities in wetlands sometimes appear to be
moving dirt on or to dry land, rather than placing it on the
nation’s waters.
A less textual Supreme Court could reach a more expansive interpretation of navigable waters. Congress could
erase any mention of navigable water from the CWA and
explicitly state in the legislative history that it is using all of
the jurisdiction it has under the Commerce Clause under
any of the three prongs of Lopez, as well as its treaty powers, which it has used to protect migratory birds and their
habitats. None of these changes is likely in the near future.
In the meantime, EPA and the Corps have no choice but
to amend their regulatory definitions of navigable waters,
acknowledging some limitations to their jurisdiction.
The agencies have proposed a new regulatory definition
of waters of the United States that includes traditionally
navigable waters, their tributaries, and adjacent wetlands.
It defines tributaries and adjacent wetlands and provides
scientific justifications for the definitions. The scientific
justifications may justify judicial deference.417 The agencies
also abandon any claim to jurisdiction over groundwater
that is tributary to navigable waters or to waters within
the second and third prongs of Lopez Commerce Clause
jurisdiction, including isolated waters used by interstate
travelers for purposes related to interstate commerce. EPA
could recapture some of those waters on a case-by-case
basis by demonstrating that, alone or in combination with
similarly situated waters in the same watershed, they have
a significant nexus in terms of flow and water quality to
other waters defined as waters of the United States. Finally,
because EPA does not mention its unitary navigable water
theory in its proposed new, comprehensive definition or in
the preamble, it can be argued that the Agency has abandoned the theory.

417. EPA’s study is a monumental review by its Office of Research and Development of modern, peer-reviewed literature on the hydrology of water quality
and water pollution. It is presently in draft form and in the process of review
by EPA’s SAB. See infra note 277. EPA will not promulgate the final version
of its rule until the SAB’s review is complete and the study is in final form.
See 79 Fed. Reg. 22188, 22190. A cynical reader may find some of the science little more than “most water is connected in the hydrological cycle”;
“surface water flows downhill”; “groundwater flows downgradient”; “organisms that live in water can’t live on dry land”; and “organisms that live in
pristine water can’t live in polluted or muddy water.”
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Appendix I
Note to readers: The body of this text is the definition of
“waters of the United States” as it currently appears in 40
C.F.R. §122. The portion of the text in brackets indicates
text that is deleted in EPA’s proposed revision of the definition, published at 79 Fed. Reg. 22188 (proposed Apr. 21,
2014). The italicized portion identifies text that is added in
EPA’s proposed revision.
Waters of the United States or waters of the U.S. means:
(a) For purposes of all sections of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. and its implementing regulations,
subject to the exclusion in paragraph (b) of this definition,
the term “waters of the United States” means:
([a]1) All waters which are currently used, were used in
the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide;
([b]2) All interstate waters, including interstate
“wetlands;”
(3) The territorial sea;
[(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, “wetlands,” sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation, or
destruction of which would affect or could affect interstate
or foreign commerce including any such waters;
(1) Which are or could be used by interstate of foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes;
(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken
and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(3) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce;]
([d]4)] All impoundments of waters [otherwise defined
as waters of the United States under] identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) and (5) of this definition”
([e]5)] [All] [T]tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through [(d)] (4) of this definition;
[(f) The territorial sea; and]
(6) All waters, including wetlands, adjacent to a water
identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this definition; and
(7) On a case by case basis, other waters, including wetlands, provided that those waters alone, or in combination
with similarly situated waters, including wetlands, located in
the same region, have a significant nexus to a water identified
in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this definition.
[(g) “Wetlands” adjacent to waters (other than waters
that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)
through (f) of this definition.] The proposed definition
lists eleven specific exclusions, including groundwater, and
defines “adjacent,” “neighboring,” “riparian area,” “ floodplain,” “tributary,” “wetland” and “significant nexus.”
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TABLE B
Analysis of Decisions
Decision
Number

Year

+/-a

Type of Caseb

Type of
Waterc

Canons Used

Number of
Number of
Canons Usedd Decisions Citede

CWA §

Supreme Court Decisions
1

2013

+

Jud. Rev.

1

1

2

402

2

2006

_

Enf.

T, W

1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,
11, 13

9

19

404

3

2004

+

Cit. S.

U

1, 4, 5, 6, 11

5

5

402

4

2001

-

Jud. Rev.

I

1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9,
11, 12

8

2

404

5

1985

+

Enf.

T, W

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9

7

404

U.S. Circuit Court Decisions
6

2011

+

Enf.

T, W

1

1

5

404

7

2011

-

Jud. Rev.

W

1, 4

2

6

404

8

2010

+

Crim.

T

1, 2

2

4

402/404

9

2009

-

Enf.

1, 2, 5, 7

4

5

404

10

2009

+

Cit. S.

W

1, 2, 4

3

5

402

11

2009

+

Enf.

W

1

1

6

404

12

2009

-

Cit. S.

U

1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
11, 13

9

10

402

13

2009

-

Cit. S.

1, 4, 7, 10

4

2

402

14

2009

+

Enf.

1

1

8

404

T, W

15

2008

+

Crim.

W

1

1

3

404

16

2007

-

Crim.

T

1

1

6

402

17

2007

+

Cit. S.

T, W

1, 2, 10

3

7

402

18

2007

+

Crim.

T

1, 4

2

9

402/404

19

2007

-

Cit. S.

W

1, 4, 16, 19

4

9

402

20

2006

+

Enf.

W

1

1

3

404

21

2006

-

Enf.

W

1

1

2

404

22

2006

+

Cit. S.

W

1, 10

2

6

402

23

2006

+

Cit. S.

U

1, 4, 6, 8, 11

5

4

402

Rapanos

24

2006

+

Crim.

T

1, 2, 4, 9, 13

5

17

404

25

2005

+

Jud. Rev.

W

1

1

5

404

26

2004

+

Cit. S.

T

1, 3

2

3

402

27

2004

+

Crim.

T

1, 3, 4, 20

4

7

402

28

2003

+

Bankr.

T, W

1, 4, 5, 9

4

7

OPA

29

2003

+

Enf.

T, W

1, 2

2

5

404

30

2003

+

Enf.

W

1, 14

2

6

404

31

2003

+

Enf.

T, W

1, 4, 9

3

13

404

32

2002

+

Cit. S.

T

1

1

3

402

33

2002

+

Enf.

W

1, 14

2

4

404

34

2001

+

Cit. S.

U

1, 4, 8

3

2

402

35

2001

+/-

Enf.

W

1

1

7

404

36

2001

-

Cit. S.

G

1, 3, 5, 7

4

8

OPA
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Year

+/-a

2001

+

Type of Caseb

Type of
Waterc

Canons Used

6-2015

Number of
Number of
Canons Usedd Decisions Citede

CWA §

SWANCC
37

Cit. S.

T

1, 5

2

8

402

38

1999

+

Cit. S.

T

1

1

2

402

39

1999

+

Crim.

T

1, 2, 10

3

5

402

40

1997

-

Crim.

T, W

1, 9

2

1

404

41

1997

+

Crim.

T

1, 2

2

9

402

42

1996

+

Cit. S.

U

1, 2, 6, 8

4

4

402

43

1994

-

Cit. S.

G, I

1, 2, 3, 4, 19

5

7

402

44

1993

+

Enf.

T, W

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

6

12

404

45

1993

-

Jud. Rev.

W

4

1

46

1992

-

Jud. Rev.

W

1

1

G

47

1990

-

Enf.

48

1988

+

Jud. Rev.

49

1988

-

Cit. S.

50

1986

+

51

1985

404
4

404

1, 4, 5, 8, 10

5

5

402

1, 3, 5, 7

4

3

402

U

1, 4

2

3

402

Enf.

W

1, 2, 10

3

1

404

+

Jud. Rev.

G, T

1, 2, 4

3

3

402

-

Enf.

W

2, 8, 17

3

1

404

Riverside Bayview
52

1984

53

1984

+

Decl. Jud.

T

1, 2

2

12

404

54

1983

+

Cit. S.

W

1, 2, 3, 4

4

8

404

55

1983

+

Enf.

W

1, 3, 5

3

1

404

56

1981

+

Taking

W

1, 2

2

7

404

57

1980

+

Enf.

T

1

1

1

402

58

1979

+

Enf.

W

1, 2, 3

3

4

404

59

1979

+

Enf.

T

1, 2, 3

3

2

402

60

1978

+

Enf.

W

1, 2, 3, 7, 8

5

2

404

61

1977

+

Jud. Rev.

G

3, 4, 6, 10, 13

5

1

402

62

1977

-

Jud. Rev.

G

1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12

7

1

402

63

1975

+

Jud. Rev.

T

1, 3

2

2

402

64

1974

+

Enf.

T

1, 2, 3

3

4

402

U.S. District Court Decisions
65

2011

+

Cit. S.

T, W

1

1

4

404

66

2011

-

Jud. Rev.

I, W

1, 4

2

3

404

67

2011

+

Enf.

T

1

1

7

404

68

2011

+

Cit. S.

T

1

1

5

402

69

2011

-

Crim.

W

1

1

7

404

70

2011

+

Cit. S.

T

1, 6

2

3

402

71

2011

+

Crim.

T

1, 2, 5, 6

4

10

402

72

2011

+

Cit. S.

T, W

1

1

5

404

73

2010

+

Enf.

T, W

1

1

8

404

74

2010

+

Jud. Rev.

T

1, 6, 15

3

3

404

75

2009

+

Cit. S.

T, W

1, 2

2

7

402

76

2009

+

Cit. S.

T

1, 2

2

2

402

77

2009

+

Jud. Rev.

W

1, 4

2

7

404

78

2009

+

Cit. S.

G

1, 2, 3, 4

4

14

402
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79

2008

-

Jud. Rev.

80

2007

+

Enf.

Type of
Waterc
T, W

Canons Used
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Number of
Number of
Canons Usedd Decisions Citede

CWA §

1

1

5

404

1, 4

2

9

404

81

2007

+

Crim.

W

1

1

6

404

82

2007

+

Enf.

W

1, 4

2

8

404

83

2007

+

Enf.

W

1

1

4

404

84

2007

-

Cit. S.

W

1

1

1

404

85

2007

-

Cit. S.

T

1

1

4

402

86

2006

+

Enf.

W

1

1

6

404

87

2006

-

Enf.

T

1, 2, 5, 9

4

8

402

2003

+

Enf.

T, W

1, 2

2

6

404

Rapanos
88
89

2003

+

Cit. S.

T, W

1

1

10

402/404

90

2003

-

Jud. Rev.

W

1, 2, 4

3

12

404

91

2002

-

Enf.

W

1, 3, 4, 8, 9

5

2

404

92

2002

+

Cit. S.

G, T

1

1

6

402

93

2002

-

Enf.

T, W

1, 3, 4, 5, 9

5

2

404

94

2002

+

Enf.

W

1, 14

2

3

404

95

2002

+

Enf.

W

1, 14

2

1

402

96

2001

+

Cit. S.

G, T

1, 2, 3

3

9

404

97

2001

+

Crim.

T, W

1, 2, 3

3

8

404

98

2001

+

Cit. S.

T

1, 5

2

6

402

99

1998

_

Enf.

W

1

1

2

404

100

1997

+

Enf.

T

1, 2

2

1

402

SWANCC

101

1997

+

Cit. S.

G, W

1, 2

2

4

402

102

1997

-

Cit. S.

G

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 18

7

11

402

103

1996

+

Cit. S.

T

1, 2

2

4

402

104

1995

+

Cit. S.

T

1

1

3

402

105

1995

+/-

Cit. S.

G

1, 2, 5

3

13

402

106

1995

+

Enf.

W

1

1

3

404

107

1994

+

Cit. S.

G

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

6

9

402

9

108

1993

+

Cit. S.

G

1, 2

2

109

1992

+

Cit. S.

W

4

1

110

1991

+

Enf.

T

1

1

402
404

3

404

111

1989

+

Cit. S.

G

2

1

402

112

1989

+

Jud. Rev.

T

4, 6

2

404

113

1989

+

Enf.

W

1

1

2

404

114

1989

+

Enf.

T, W

1

1

1

404

115

1988

+

Cit. S.

G

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

6

7

402

116

1987

+

Enf.

W

4

1

1

404

117

1985

-

Cit. S.

G

1, 2, 3, 4, 6

5

4

402

Riverside Bayview
118

1985

+

Jud Rev.

W

1, 5

2

2

404

119

1984

+

Enf.

T, W

1, 2, 3

3

7

404

120

1984

+

Enf.

W

1, 4

2

3

404
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b.
c.
d.

e.

Decision
Number

Year

+/-a

Type of Caseb

Type of
Waterc

Canons Used

Number of
Number of
Canons Usedd Decisions Citede

CWA §

121

1984

+

Enf.

W

1, 2, 3

3

3

404

122

1983

+

Enf.

W

1, 2

2

8

404

123

1982

+

Jud. Rev.

W

1, 3, 4, 7

4

3

404

124

1981

+

Enf.

W

1

1

1

404

125

1981

+

Enf.

W

1, 2

2

2

404

126

1980

+

Enf.

W

127

1979

+

Jud. Rev.

128

1976

+

Enf.

1, 2, 3

3

5

404

1

1

10

404

T

2, 3

2

402

129

1977

+

Jud. Rev.

W

1, 2, 3, 7

4

2

404

130

1977

+

Jud Rev.

T

1, 2, 3

3

8

404

131

1975

+

Cit. S.

W

1, 4

2

5

404

2

404

132

1975

+

Cit. S.

W

1, 2

2

133

1975

+

Jud. Rev.

W

3

1

404

134

1975

+

Jud. Rev.

W

13

1

402

135

1975

+

Crim.

T

1, 2, 5

3

136

1975

-

Enf.

G

2, 3, 5, 6

4

2

402

137

1974

+

Enf.

W

1, 2, 3, 6, 7

5

5

404

1

402

Plus (+) indicates an expansive interpretation of “navigable waters”; minus (-) indicates a restrictive interpretation. Although an interpretation of navigable
waters may be expansive, the environmental party may have lost the case for other reasons.
Cit. S. means citizen suit; Crim. means criminal prosecution; Enf. means civil enforcement; Jud. Rev. means judicial review.
G means groundwater; I means isolated water; T means tributary; U means unitary navigable water; W means wetlands.
Canons used to interpret “navigable waters”: (1) precedent; (2) broad interpretation to achieve statutory purpose; (3) legislative history; (4) deference;
(5) plain meaning; (6) structure of statute; (7) harmonize with other statutes; (8) avoid absurd results; (9) avoid constitutional issues; (10) interpret exceptions narrowly; (11) honor federalism; (12) exception proves the rule; (13) give every word meaning; (14) interpret waivers narrowly (finality); (15) inclusiveness of definition; (16) exclusiveness of definition; (17) equity; (18) avoid administrative difficulties; (19) inclusion of one implies exclusion of another; and
(20) rule of lenity.
Refers only to Supreme Court precedent interpreting navigable waters or lower court precedent interpreting navigable waters in the CWA.
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